Electoral Choices, Ethnic Accommodations, and the Consolidation of Coalitions: Critiquing the Runoff Clause of the Afghan Constitution by Mobasher, Mohammad Bashir
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 26 Number 3 
6-1-2017 
Electoral Choices, Ethnic Accommodations, and the Consolidation 
of Coalitions: Critiquing the Runoff Clause of the Afghan 
Constitution 
Mohammad Bashir Mobasher 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Election Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mohammad B. Mobasher, Electoral Choices, Ethnic Accommodations, and the Consolidation of 
Coalitions: Critiquing the Runoff Clause of the Afghan Constitution, 26 Wash. L. Rev. 413 (2017). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol26/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Compilation © 2017 Washington International Law Journal Association 
 
 
ELECTORAL CHOICES, ETHNIC ACCOMMODATIONS, 
AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF COALITIONS: 
CRITIQUING THE RUNOFF CLAUSE OF THE AFGHAN 
CONSTITUTION 
Mohammad Bashir Mobasher* 
Abstract: Article sixty-one of the Afghan Constitution requires a candidate to 
win an absolute majority of votes to become the president.  This constitutional rule 
comprises a runoff clause, which prescribes a second round of elections between the two 
front-runners should no candidate win over 50% of the votes in the first round.  While 
this article agrees with the majority view of Afghan scholars and politicians who see the 
runoff clause as instrumental to developing trans-ethnic coalitions and governments, it 
distinguishes between the formation of alliances and their consolidation.  Ultimately, this 
article posits that the runoff clause actually impedes the long-term success of these 
coalitions.  The analysis reveals that the formation of cross-ethnic coalitions under the 
runoff clause does not necessarily eliminate the likelihood of ethnic tensions during or 
after elections. 
Having revealed some inherent flaws of the runoff clause, this article introduces 
some alternatives to, and adaptations of, the runoff system, which have been adopted in 
the constitutions, and electoral laws of other multiethnic states.  It examines these 
alternatives in light of counterfactual simulations using the last three presidential 
elections.  Through these observations, this article contributes to the ongoing legal and 
political discourse on reforming the Constitution and the electoral laws that began with 
the National Unity Government Agreement. 
INTRODUCTION 
Unlike the parliamentary elections that have exacerbated party 
fragmentation, the presidential elections of Afghanistan have given rise to 
coalitions that have transcended ethnic boundaries.
1
  These emerging 
                                                        
*  PhD student at the University of Washington School of Law. I’d like to thank Prof. Robert 
Pekkanen and Prof. Elizabeth Baldwin for spending their precious time on reviewing and editing this topic 
and offering invaluable insights and comments. I would also like to thank the editors of Washington 
International Law Journal for their insightful comments throughout the revision process. The helpful 
feedback from my dear friends Abdullah Dastageer Popalzai, Shukrullah Yamin, and Hashmat Khalil 
Nadirpoor should not go unnoticed and unappreciated.  
1
  Andrew Reynolds & John Carey, Fixing Afghanistan’ s Electoral System: Arguments and Options 
for Reform, AFG. RES. AND EVALUATION UNIT, 9–10 (2012), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5003f05a2.html. Since the first parliamentary election (2005), Afghanistan 
experienced an increase in the number of parties and decrease in their share of seats in the Assembly.  For 
example, the number of parties reached to over one hundred by the second parliamentary election (2010), 
until which a reregistration of political parties was required by the new Political Party Law.  At the same 
time, parties’ share of seats decreased from 156 seats in 2005 to ninety-three seats in 2010. The number of 
independent MPs almost doubled in 2010 (from 37.2% in 2005 to 62.4% in 2010).  In 2005, the largest 
party in the parliament was Hizb-Naween Afghanistan (The New Afghanistan Party), which won twenty-
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presidential coalitions have demonstrated popularity, cross-ethnic appeal, 
and political accommodation by elites.
2
  The tradition of coalition-building 
has become firmly entrenched in the presidential elections of Afghanistan.  
However, despite this apparent potential for political development, 
coalitions have remained weak and prone to dissolution.  Most coalitions 
have been built on the basis of patronage and personal politics while lacking 
titles, organizational structures, and ideologies.
3
  Some electoral coalitions 
have not even lasted long enough to witness elections.
4
  Others have 
dissolved immediately after elections.
5
  Notably, the number of coalitions is 
on the rise,
6
 which indicates a trend resembling party fragmentation in 
Afghanistan.
7
  Most importantly, although cross-ethnic coalitions have 
emerged during the presidential elections, they were not able to prevent 
ethnic tensions in the 2009 and 2014 elections.
8
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
five seats (10%).  The same party won only a single seat in 2010.  In 2010, the largest share of seats by a 
party was eighteen.  The same party, Jamiat Islami (Islamic Society Party), had twenty-two seats in 2005. 
2
  Scholars like Thomas Rutting and Anna Larson preferred the word proto-parties for Afghan 
parties since these organizations do not constitute parties in the conventional sense.  See Thomas Rutting, 
Islamists, Leftists – and a Void in the Center: Afghanistan's Political Parties and where they come from 
(1902-2006), 1 KONRAD STIFTUNG ADENAUER (2006), http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_9674-544-2-30.pdf; 
Anna Larson, Afghanistan’s New Democratic Parties: A Means To Organize Democratization? AFG. RES. 
AND EVALUATION UNIT, 5 (2009) http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/49c254a02.pdf. 
Thomas Rutting described proto-parties as “the parties in the making” and characterized them as the 
parties that “most lack cohesion and structure, a distinguishable program, and internal democracy.  Many 
are extremely hierarchical or even authoritarian, often organized along ethnic lines.”  These authors 
describe Afghan proto-parties as not resembling parties in established and/or Western democracies, in that 
they are largely based on the ethnic ex-military factions that fought in the civil war.  See id. 
3
  Mohammad Bashir Mobasher, Understanding Ethnic-Electoral Dynamics: How Ethnic Politics 
Affect Electoral Laws and Election Outcomes in Afghanistan, 51 GONZ. L. REV. 355, 364 (2016) (“The 
second step [of candidates for developing cross-ethnic coalitions] is to draw the support of elites . . . by the 
promises of power sharing, distribution of public funds, and other social and economic pledges.”). 
4
  Id. at 414.  From twenty-two large coalitions, ten coalitions went through dissolution or 
reformulation before elections.  See infra Table I. 
5
  See Mobasher, supra note 3.  From twenty-two large coalitions, only four coalitions were able to 
survive at least partly after elections.  See infra Table I. 
6
  See infra Table I. 
7
  Ministry of Justice, Registered Political Parties and Social Organizations (May 4, 2016), 
http://moj.gov.af/en/page/registered-political-parties-and-social-organizations/1700. As of 2016, fifty to 
fifty-seven organizations registered as political parties in the Ministry of Justice.  Interestingly, the listed 
number of registered parties is different from the English version (fifty parties) to Dari and Pashtu versions 
(fifty-seven parties) of the Website of the Ministry of Justice. 
8
  Int’l Crisis Group, Afghanistan’s Political Transition, ASIA REPORT N 260, (Oct. 16, 2014), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/260-afghanistan-s-political-
transition.pdf; see also NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST., POLITICAL PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN: A REVIEW OF THE 
STATE OF POLITICAL PARTIES AFTER 2009 AND 2010 ELECTIONS  28 (2011) [hereinafter NDI]; see also BEN 
SMITH, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR., POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN (2011); see also Frud 
Bezhan, Ahead Of Presidential Vote, Afghan Political Forces Divide Along Ethnic Lines, RADIO FREE 
EUROPE (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.rferl.org/content/afghan-politics-feature/25101500.html.  The 
presidential elections of 2009 and 2014 have led to an almost explosive level of ethnic divide and tensions.  
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This article provides a systematic analysis of the runoff clause of 
Article 61 of the Afghan Constitution and its impact on the formation and 
consolidation of coalitions.
9
  While this article agrees with most Afghan 
scholars and politicians who view the runoff clause as instrumental to 
developing trans-ethnic coalitions and governments, it distinguishes between 
the formation of alliances and their consolidation.
10
  Ultimately, this article 
posits that the runoff system actually impedes the long-term success of these 
coalitions primarily by encouraging patronage politics.  Through this 
analysis, it also reveals that the formation of cross-ethnic coalitions under 
the runoff system does not necessarily eliminate the likelihood of ethnic 
tensions.  In light of these observations, this article proposes a revisitation of 
Article 61 and the adoption of an electoral system that helps consolidate 
cross-ethnic coalitions and reduces ethnic tensions.  Part I of this article 
focuses on how the coalitions form under the runoff rule in Afghanistan.  
Part II explains how the runoff clause hinders the consolidation of coalitions 
and depoliticization of ethnic issues.  Finally, Part III reviews and explains 
some alternative systems and regulations that have been instrumental in 
instituting cross-ethnic coalitions and preventing ethnic conflict in different 
divided societies.  
This article contributes to the ongoing legal and political discourse on 
reforming the Constitution and the electoral laws that began with the 
National Unity Government Agreement.
11
  This Agreement, and the 
subsequent legislative decrees, which came about as the result of the 
disastrous 2014 presidential election,
12
 proposed amending the Constitution 
                                                                                                                                                                     
In both elections, the second rounds were boycotted by one of the front-runners and the threat to violence 
was louder than ever.  The runoff of 2014 presidential election almost brought about a civil war, if it was 
not for international intervention. 
9
  See DAVID M. FARRELL, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 46–47 (2d ed. 
2011).  The runoff clause requires two rounds of elections.  Under this system of election, all candidates 
compete in the first round, some of them wanting to win outright.  However, if no candidate wins the 
required majority (mostly, 50+1), a second round election will be held, in which only front-runners 
compete.  
10
  This conclusion was derived from interviews with forty scholars and politicians, which included 
MPs, leaders of parties and coalitions, and members of different Independent Electoral Commissions.  The 
interview was conducted between March 20 and June 2.  
11
  Agreement between the Two Campaign Teams Regarding the Structure of the National Unity 
Government, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 21, 2014, http://documents.latimes.com/agreement-between-two-campaign-
teams-regarding-structure-national-unity-government/ [hereinafter Agreement]. 
12
  Rob Crilly, Afghan presidential candidate rejects election 'coup' and 'plans parallel government', 
THE TELEGRAPH (Jul. 8, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews 
/asia/afghanistan/10952827/Afghan-presidential-candidate-rejects-election-coup-and-plans-parallel-
government.html.  The massive fraud in the second round of 2014 led to electoral crisis and heated ethnic 
tensions.  Abdullah Abdullah renounced the election result and declared his intention of forming his own 
government regardless of election results.  See Int’l Crisis Group, supra note 8, at 18; see also KENNETH 
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and alternating electoral designs.
13
  Subsequent to the Agreement, however, 
the legal and political discourse has predominantly focused on reforming the 
parliamentary electoral system, known as the Single Non-Transferable Vote 
(SNTV).
14
  The runoff clause attracted very few scholars’ attention.15  Even 
then, the scholarship on the runoff system remained merely descriptive due 
to the common perception that the runoff system encourages the 
development of cross-ethnic coalitions and government.
16
  This issue is ripe 
for examination, however, since the formation of broad-based coalitions 
during the presidential elections is juxtaposed with ethnic tensions in these 
elections, as well as the failure of coalitions to survive elections and their 
                                                                                                                                                                     
KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AFGHANISTAN: POLITICS, ELECTIONS, AND GOVERNMENT 
PERFORMANCE 28 (2015).  Later, Abdullah Abdullah’s supporters gathered at the Loya Jirga (Grand 
Council) hall, many of them heavily armed, shouting at him to declare a ‘parallel state’.  Some of them 
“allegedly made preparations to seize control of government buildings in at least three provinces and 
occupy the presidential palace in Kabul.”  
13
  Agreement, supra note 11, Sec. E; Farman-e-Taqnini [Legis. Decree] No. 40, 1394 (2015) 
[hereinafter “Farman 40”]; Farman-e-Taqnini [Legis. Decree] No. 83, 1394 (2015) [hereinafter “Farman 
83”].  Complete versions of both reports are available at ELECTORAL REFORM: A REPORT ON THE STUDIES, 
PERFORMANCE, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL ELECTORAL REFORM COMMISSION 187–213 
(Asadullah Sa’adati, ed., 1395) (2016).  
14
  See Sayed Mahdi Munadi, Intekhabat Dar Keshwarhai Pasamunze’a wa Darshai Barai 
Afghanistan [Elections in Post-Conflict Societies and the Lessons for Afghanistan], in DEMOCRACY 
AFGHANI: FURSAT HA WA CHALISH HA [AFGHAN DEMOCRACY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES] 41–60 
(Mohammad Nabi Ahmadi & Majid Ismaelzada eds., 1393) [2014]; Sarwar Danish, Anwa Nezamhai 
Intekhabati; Chegonagi Tarahi, Mazaya wa Ma’ayeb [Kinds of Electoral Systems, Their Designing, 
Advantages and Disadvantages], in ANDISHA MOASER, FASELNAMA WEZHA INTEKHABAT [SPECIAL FOR 
ELECTIONS QUARTERLY] 49–52 (1394) [2015]; Mohammad Qasem Urfani, Negahi Muqayesa’ee Ba Nezam 
Hai Intekhabati [A Comparative Perspective of Electoral Systems], in ANDISHA MOASER, FASELNAMA 
WEZHA INTEKHABAT [SPECIAL FOR ELECTIONS QUARTERLY] 81–99 (1394) [2015]; Mohammad Ishaq Arefi, 
Mutanaseb Sazi Nezam Intekhabati Ba Arzesh Hai Qanoon Asasi Wa Waziat Chand Qawmi [Complying 
the Electoral Systems to the Values of the Constitution and Multiethnic Context of Afghanistan], in 
ANDISHA MOASER, FASELNAMA WEZHA INTEKHABAT [SPECIAL FOR ELECTIONS QUARTERLY] 125–139 
(1394) [2015]; Mohammad Sarwar Jawadi, Zafha Wa Ma’ayeb System Intekhabati Afghanistan [The 
Disadvantages of Afghanistan’s Electoral System], in ANDISHA MOASER, FASELNAMA WEZHA INTEKHABAT 
[SPECIAL FOR ELECTIONS QUARTERLY] 101–123 (1394) [2015]; Qasem Ali Sedaqat, Marzbandi Hawza Hai 
Intekhabati Dar Afghanistan [Districting Measures in Afghanistan], in DEMOCRACY AFGHANI: FURSAT HA 
WA CHALISH HA [AFGHAN DEMOCRACY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES] 113–134 (Mohammad Nabi 
Ahmadi and Majid Ismaelzada eds., 1393) [2014]; ASADULLAH SA’ADATI, ET. AL., ELECTORAL REFORM: A 
REPORT ON THE STUDIES, PERFORMANCE, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL ELECTORAL REFORM 
COMMISSION (Asadullah Sa’adati ed., 1395) [2016]; ANNA LARSON, UNITED STATES INST. OF PEACE, 
POLITICAL PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN 3 (2015). 
15
  See MOHAMMAD ASHRAF RASULY, TAHLIL WA NAQD QANOON-E-ASASI AFGHANISTAN [A CRITIC 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN] 75 (1389) [2010]; MOHAMMAD TAHIR HASHEMI, HUQOOQ ASASI 
WA NEHADHAI SIASI [THE CONSTITUTION AND THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS] 143 (1387) [2007]; see also 
JAWAD TAQI-ZADA, INTEKHABAT RIASAT JAMHURI DAR QANOON ASASI AFGHANISTAN [PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION], in SALNAMAH MOTAL’AT HOQUQY AFGHANISTAN [YEARBOOK OF 
AFGHAN LEGAL STUDIES] 170–182 (1394) [2016] (Jawad Taqi-zada has been the only author who 
explained the technicalities of the system in full depth, based on a comparative analysis of the system in 
Afghanistan, Iran, and France).   
16 
 See supra note 10. 
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aftermath.  This article is the first attempt to expose that juxtaposition, 
suggesting that the runoff clause should be amended or replaced.  
I. THE RUNOFF CLAUSE AND THE FORMATION OF CROSS-ETHNIC 
COALITIONS 
Article 61 of the Afghan Constitution requires a candidate to win an 
absolute majority of votes in an election to become the president.
17
  It 
includes a runoff clause, which provides that, “[i]f in the first round none of 
the candidates gets more than fifty percent of the votes, elections for the 
second round shall be held . . . and, in this round, only two candidates who 
have received the highest number of votes in the first round shall 
participate.” 18   The electoral framework this clause sets for presidential 
elections is also known as run-off system,
19
 majority-runoff,
20
 delayed 
runoff,
21
 contingent runoff,
22
 two ballots,
23
 second ballot,
24
 double-ballot 
(DB),
 25
 double-ballot runoff,
26
 or two-round system
27
 in electoral studies.
28
  
                                                        
17
  QANUN ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMAI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION], art. 61  (Jan. 26, 2004) (Afg.), 
http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/afg/images/pliki/TheConstitution.pdf. 
18
  Id. 
19
  Massimo Bordignon, Tommaso Nannicini & Guido Tabellini, Moderating Political Extremism: 
Single Round vs. Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule, 1 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper 
No. 7561) (2013); Karine Van Der Straeten et al., Sorting Out Mechanical and Psychological Effects in 
Candidate Elections: An Appraisal with Experimental Data (2013) (Working Paper, S. 12-296). 
20
  Pippa Norris, Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems, INT’L 
POL. SCI. REV. 4 (1997); FARRELL, supra note 9, at 46–47.  
21
  RACHEL LEWIS ET AL., MAJORITY RULE IN INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: THE 
DOMINANT ROLE OF RUNOFFS AROUND THE WORLD 2 (2006). 
22
  Id. 
23
  FARRELL, supra note 9, at 45 
24
  ENID LAKEMAN & JAMES D. LAMBERT, VOTING IN DEMOCRACIES: A STUDY OF MAJORITY AND 
PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 53 (1959); Norris, supra note 20, at 3. 
25
  Giovanni Sartori, The Party Effects of Electoral Systems, in POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY 
95 (Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther eds., 2001); Thomas Fujiwara, A Regression Discontinuity Test of 
Strategic Voting and Duverger’s Law, 6 Q. J. POL. SCI. 197, 203 (2011). 
26
  GIOVANNI SARTORI, PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 139 (1976). 
27
  John C. Courtney, Plurality-Majority Electoral Systems: A Review, 13 (Advisory Comm. of 
Registered Political Parties, Presentation Paper) (1999), 
http://www.elections.ca/res/rec/fra/sys/courtney_e.pdf. 
28
  See DOUGLAS W. RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS 107 (1967) (runoff 
rule is commonly classified as a majoritarian rule); FARRELL, supra note 9, at 45; Sartori, supra note 25, at 
95. 
 However, not all types of runoff are majoritarian.  In fact, constitutional designers have adopted 
three different variations of the runoff rules in different countries: (a) majority-runoff, which is the most 
popular runoff system, requires a threshold of 50% in the first round; (b) qualified-runoff, which is adopted 
for presidential elections in some Southern American countries including Nicaragua and Costa Rica, 
requires a threshold below 50% for the first round; and (c) plurality runoff, which is popularly used for 
parliamentary elections, requires a very low threshold for winning the first round.  For instance, in France 
the threshold is merely 12.5% while in Magnolia it is 25%.  For the threshold in Nicaragua, see LAS 
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Today, the runoff system is a common electoral design for 
presidential elections.
29
  Most countries with elected presidents require a 
second round election between the top two candidates.
30
  From seventy-two 
countries with presidential constitutions, forty countries use the runoff 
system for electing their presidents.
31
  The popular purpose for adopting this 
electoral system has been to consolidate support behind the most viable 
candidate and encourage development of broad-based coalitions.
32
  
Similarly, perhaps the reason for adopting this electoral system in the 
Constitution of Afghanistan was that presidential candidates must be able to 
appeal to voters across ethnic groups.  Assuming election results reflect 
ethnic headcounts, as indicated by Donald Horowitz in Ethnic Groups in 
Conflict,
33
 the fifty percent threshold encourages cross-ethnic alliances in 
Afghanistan.
34
  This is because none of the ethnic groups alone can deliver 
fifty percent of the votes.
35
  Based on the most cited estimation, the largest 
ethnic group, Pashtuns, represents forty-two percent of the population.
36
  
The next three largest groups—Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks—are estimated 
to form between nine to thirty percent of Afghan population each.
37
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
CONSTITUCIONES DE NICARAGUA [THE CONSTITUTION OF NICARAGUA], Jan. 1, 1987, art. 147 (1), 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nicaragua_2005.pdf.  For Costa Rica, see CONSTITUCIÓN 
POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF COSTA RICA], Nov. 
7, 1949, art. 139, http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner/kostarika.pdf.  For details about 
each type of runoff systems, see André Blais & Peter Loewen, The French Electoral System and its Effects, 
32 WEST EUROPE POLITICS 345, 345 (2009); ANDREW REYNOLDS, BENJAMIN REILLY & ANDREW ELLIS, 
ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL IDEA HANDBOOK 27 (2008). 
29
  FARRELL, supra note 9, at 45; Bordignon Nannicinni & Tabellini, supra note 19, at 1; Laurent 
Bouton and Gabriele Gratton, Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger’s hypothesis, 10 
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS 283, 284 (2015). 
30
  Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, 1 J. DEMOCRACY 51, 57 (1990). 
31
  See Comparative Data, Electoral Systems: Presidents, THE ELECTORAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, 
https://aceproject.org/aceen/topics/es/esd/esd01/esd01e/default (last visited Jul. 3, 2016). 
 This system has been preferred for presidential elections because the assumption is that the first 
person in the country should be chosen by at least a majority of the citizens.  Some scholars, however, 
challenge this assumption, suggesting that not all citizens turn out to vote in the elections and thus 
technically this system does not represent a majority of citizens.  See FARRELL, supra note 9, at 48–49. 
32
  Norris, supra note 20, at 4. 
33
  DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT, 196 (2d ed. 2001). 
34
  See Mobasher, supra note 3, at 363. 
35
  See id. 
36
  WORLD FACTBOOK: AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworldfactbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_af (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2016).  This estimation has been used by UN agencies, NATO forces, and many national and 
international organizations including some working on elections in Afghanistan. 
37
  Since there have not been any official estimations, different estimations of Afghan ethnic groups 
have been provided by different sources and authors.  It is likely that ethnic identities of some Afghan 
authors have influenced their choices of estimations.  See, e.g., id. at 3 (estimates that Tajiks make up 27%, 
Hazaras 9%, and Uzbeks 9%); THOMAS BARFIELD, AFGHANISTAN: A CULTURAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY 
26 (2010) (estimating that Pashtuns make up 40%, Tajiks 30%, Hazaras 15%, and Uzbeks with Turkmens 
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Assuming these disputed estimations are accurate, this ethnic distribution is 
optimal for ethnic accommodations and continuity of democracy; and, in 
terms of building cross-ethnic coalitions, it corresponds well with the fifty 
percent threshold.
38
  As such, the runoff system renders what Donald 
Horowitz and Benjamin Reilly expect from an electoral system in a divided 
society: making candidates reciprocally dependent on the votes of ethnic 
groups other than their own.
39
  
Most studies have associated the runoff system with the formation of 
broad-based coalitions.
40
  Maurice Duverger stated that “in all countries 
where the second ballot has been working there are more or less clear traces 
of electoral alliances.”41  This system became appealing to constitutional 
designers across the world when it transformed the fragmented party system 
of France into two political blocs.
42
  Indeed, the fourth republic of France 
adopted a runoff system in order to prevent party-hopping
43
 and cabinet 
instability.
44
  While explaining the runoff system in France, Robert Elgie 
posited that “this system punishes stand-alone parties [and] or groups.”45  
Hence, it is no wonder that in Afghanistan, instead of relying on “proto 
parties,” presidential candidates tend to form broader formal or informal 
                                                                                                                                                                     
about 10% of the population in Afghanistan); Muhammad Saleem Mazhar et al., Ethnic Factor in 
Afghanistan, 19 J. POL. STUDIES 98 (2012) (positing Pashtuns are 50% to 54%, Tajiks 26% to 30%, 
Hazaras 7%, and Uzbeks 8%); Nahid Suleman, Ethnic Discrimination in Afghanistan, INTERMEDIA, 2, 
http://www.intermedia.org.pk/pdf/pak_afghan/Naheed_Soleman_Ethnic_Discrimination_in_Afghanistan.p
df (estimating that Pashtuns make up 38%, Tajiks 25%, Hazaras 19%, Uzbeks 6%, and others 12%); 
Zaman Stanizai, From Identity Crisis to Identity in Crisis in Afghanistan, THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE 3 
(2009) (suggesting that Pashtuns make up 60% and Tajiks 12% of the population in Afghanistan).  
38
  For the optimality of ethnic distributions for consolidation of democracy in different societies, 
refer to AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRCY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION, 55–61 
(1977); see also BENJAMIN REILLY, DEMOCRACY AND DIVERSITY 64 (2006). 
39
  See HOROWITZ, supra note 33, at 647–49; BENJAMIN REILLY, DEMOCRACY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES: 
ELECTORAL ENGINEERING FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 10 (2001). 
40
  See MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES 328 (1954); André Blais & Indridi H. Indridason, 
Making Candidates Count: The Logic of Electoral Alliances in Two-Round Legislative Elections, 69 J. OF 
POL., 193, 193–94 (2007); Courtney, supra note 27, at 13; Lise Rakner & Nicolas Walle, Opposition 
Weakness in Africa: Democratization by Elections? 20 J. OF DEMOCRACY 108, 116 (2009). 
41
  DUVERGER, supra note 40, at 328. 
42
  MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
DESIGN AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS 213 (1992). 
43
  See Vicky Randall, Party Regulation in Conflict-Prone Societies: More Dangers than 
Opportunities, in POLITICAL PARTIES IN CONFLICT-PRONE SOCIETIES: REGULATION, ENGINEERING AND 
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT, 245 (Benjamin Reilly and Per Nordlund, eds., 2008) (used by some scholars 
to mean party fragmentation). 
44
   Although some political scientists posed a question about whether the use of the runoff rule in 
France’s parliamentary elections or presidential elections should be given the credit for government 
stability, see SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 214–15; see also RAE, supra note 28, at 109. 
45
  Robert Elgie, France: Stacking the Deck, in THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 126 (Michael 
Gallagher & Paul Mitchell, eds., 2009). 
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coalitions.  The fact that most cross-ethnic coalitions are developed in 
preparation for presidential election and not parliamentary election indicates 
this advantage of the runoff system in Afghanistan.
46
  According to Table I, 
sixteen coalitions were formed before the presidential elections, and three 
coalitions before the parliamentary elections.  
Table I.  This table shows the number of coalitions that are 
formed prior to elections or some important events, such as the 
Emergency Loya Jirga (Grand Council), which elected a 
temporary president, and the Constitutional Loya Jirga.
47
 
                                                        
46
  This table includes only those coalitions that have either officially announced their existence and 
objectives or have been popular information coalitions and have been formed for winning the elections.  
Otherwise, presumably all candidates form their own small and large (mostly informal) coalitions. 
47
  Who is Who, AFGHAN BIOGRAPHY, http://www.afghan-bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghan 
bios&id=3438&task=view&total=3261&start=664&Itemid=2 (last visited Nov. 28, 2015); Thomas 
Rutting, On Your Marks! Alliances And Actors Before The 2014 Presidential Election, AFGHANISTAN 
ANALYSTS NETWORK 15 (Sep. 17, 2013), https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/on-your-marks-alliances-
and-actors-before-the-2014-presidential-election/; ICSD, supra note 8, at 5; Bezhan, supra note 8; NDI, 
supra note 8, at 5; INT’L CRISIS GROUP, Policy Briefing 141: Afghanistan’s Parties In Transition 5 (June, 
2013), https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-
8#q=Afghanistan%E2%80%99s+Parties+in+Transition%2Fpdf; REVIEW TRIBUNAL, Background Paper: 
Afghanistan: Political Parties and Insurgent Groups 2001-2013, 5 (2013), 
https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1369733768_ppig2.pdf [hereinafter TRIBUNAL 2013]; Jackson 
Keith, Backgrounder: The Formation Of Electoral Alliances In Afghan Politics In 2014, INST. FOR THE 
STUDY OF WAR, 5 (2013); Thomas Rutting, Ambiguity Reiterated: The 20-Parties' 'Democracy Charter, 
AFGHANISTAN ANALYST NETWORK (Sep. 26, 2012), https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/ambiguity-
reiterated-the-20-parties-democracy-charter/. 
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It bears mentioning that none of the coalitions that have been formed 
between the 2014 presidential election and the possible 2017 parliamentary 
election have declared winning parliamentary seats as their objective.  On 
the contrary, the New National Front of Afghanistan (NNF), which was 
formed in 2016, declared its intention of replacing the incumbents in the 
government in the next election.
48
  Likewise, the Council for Protection and 
Stability of Afghanistan (APSC) has demanded that the country amend the 
Constitution by holding Constitutional Loya Jirga.
49
  The alliance also 
demanded the resignation of the Unity Government after the Loya Jirga 
                                                        
48
  “Afghanistan’s New National Front” Announces Existence, ATN NEWS (Jan. 14, 2016), 
http://ariananews.af/latest-news/afghanistans-new-national-front-announces-existence/. 
49
  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 26, 2004, art. 110–111 
(Afg.).  Constitutional Loya Jirga [Loya Jirga Qanon-e-Asasi] is the grand council that amends the 
Constitution.  This council includes members of the parliament as well as the presidents of provincial and 
district councils. 
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since the government was formed through a compromise rather than a fair 
election.”50 
Furthermore, the interaction of the runoff clause with the regime type, 
which is the presidential system in Afghanistan, advances its effect on 
building cross-ethnic coalitions.
51
  Presidential elections, unlike most 
parliamentary elections, require pre-electoral (proactive) coalition building.
52
  
The advantage that pre-electoral coalitions have is that they are more 
amenable to cross-ethnic votes and alliances, especially since candidates and 
voters do not have perfect information about the viability of candidates and 
the optimal size of winning coalitions.
53
  Unlike conventional wisdom in the 
literature, which suggests that the existence of perfect information is 
important for strategic coordination, the absence of such information urges 
serious presidential candidates to make broader rather than minimal winning 
coalitions.
54
  Hence, while a threshold of fifty percent by the runoff system 
can allow a minimal coalition of two or three ethnic groups, the incertitude 
that the nature of presidential elections exerts pushes for a far broader 
coalition.  
                                                        
50
  See Tariq Majidi, Ahadi Launches New Party, Says NUG Has Failed, TOLONEWS, Jan. 2016, 
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/content/new-national-front-afghanistan-opposition-party-launched; Mir 
Abed Joenda, Elam Amadaqi Shurai Herasat wa Subat Afghanistan Bar Barguzari Loya Jirga [The 
Council for Protection and Stability of Afghanistan Declares Readiness for Holding Loya Jirga] 
TOLONEWS, (2016), http://www.tolonews.com/fa/afghanistan/23253-new-council-pushes-government-to-
convene-jirga-before-august; also see Daudzai: Namitawan Hukumat Maslahati Ra Madamul-Umur Qabol 
Kard [Daudzai: We Cannot Accept A Compromised Government to Stay Forever] RADIO AZADI, Sar. 8, 
1395 (2016), http://da.azadiradio.com/a/27825262.html. 
51
  The presidential regime was adopted by Chapter Three of the Constitution.  See THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, art. 60–70 (Jan. 26, 2004).  
52
  Scott Mainwaring & Matthew S. Shugart, Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical 
Appraisal, 4/29 COMP. POL., 449, 466 (1997); see also Danielle Resnick, Do electoral coalitions facilitate 
democratic consolidation in Africa?, 5/19 PARTY POLITICS 735, 740 (2011).  In parliamentary elections, the 
electoral system determines whether a pre-electoral or post-electoral coalition is feasible.  “In legislative 
elections, proportional representation (PR) systems are considered less likely to encourage pre-electoral 
coalitions because votes are not necessarily wasted in the traditional sense.  Exceptions, however, can occur 
if threshold levels for gaining representation are relatively high, such as Mozambique’s former 5 percent 
threshold level.” 
53
  Donald Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Processes, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF 
DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND DEMOCRACY (Andrew Reynolds, 
ed., 2002); see also Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties under a "Public Rights" First 
Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 1964 (2003) (another advantage of pre electoral coalition 
building in the long run is that it, “by definition, reflects a choice to air strong political differences at the 
stage of party formation, rather than allowing those differences to invade the electoral and policymaking 
processes.”).  
54
  GARY W. COX, MAKING VOTES COUNT, STRATEGIC COORDINATION IN WORLD’S ELECTORAL 
SYSTEMS, 79 (1997); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY, at 7 (1957); see also 
JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THE THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 8–9 
(3d ed. 1953). 
June 2017 Electoral Choices, Ethnic Accommodations 423 
 
One other constitutional rule that has built on the majoritarian effect 
of the runoff system is Article 60 of the Constitution, which is also reflected 
in Article 45 of the Election Law.
55
  Article 60 requires each presidential 
candidate to introduce two vice presidential candidates prior to election.
56
  In 
order to appeal to voters across ethnic lines, in all three presidential 
elections, the leading candidates have shown great incentives to choose their 
first and second vice presidents from two different ethnic groups.
57
  In fact, 
calling the elections merely a race between presidential candidates is not 
entirely accurate since, based on Article 60 of the Constitution, the 
presidential and vice presidential candidates campaign together, compiling 
votes from their respective constituencies.
58
  At times vice presidential 
candidates have contributed more votes per capita—or an equal proportion 
of votes—from their constituencies to their ticket than their presidential 
mates.
59
  The following Table shows the composition of presidential teams 
in the last three elections.  
Table II.  For the 2004 and 2009 elections, this table shows the 
composition of leading presidential tickets. For 2014, the table 
shows the composition of all candidates.
60
 
                                                        
55
  QANUN INTEKHABAT [ELECTION LAW] 15/5/1392 [Jun. 8, 2014,] S. 1112, art. 45 (Afg.). 
 56  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, art. 60 (Jan. 26, 2004); 
see also ELECTION LAW, Jun. 8, 2014, S. 1112, art. 45. 
57
  Although presidential tickets have shown cross-ethnic votes and accommodations, there are some 
issues with these ticket compositions.  Mainly, the last three presidential elections demonstrated that the 
composition of presidential teams represented only the largest ethnic groups.  Likely, presidential 
candidates chose running mates from the four larger ethnic groups because those candidates would draw 
greater numbers of ethnically motivated support.  As Table I shows, other smaller size ethnic groups have 
remained unrepresented in presidential teams.  
58
  The article states that, “[t]he President shall have two Vice Presidents, first and second.  The 
Presidential candidate shall declare to the nation names of both vice presidential running mates.”  See THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, art. 60 (Jan. 26, 2004). 
59
  See Mobasher, supra note 3, at 402–409. 
60
  The 2004 Presidential Election Results, INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMISSION OF AFGHANISTAN, 
http://www.iec.org.af/public_html/Election%20Results%20Website/english/english.htm (last visited May 
2, 2015) [hereinafter “IEC 2004”]; The 2009 Presidential Election Results, INDEPENDENT ELECTION 
COMMISSION OF AFGHANISTAN, http://www.iec.org.af/results_2009/leadingCandidate.html (last visited 
May 2, 2016) [hereinafter “IEC 2009”]; The 2014 Presidential Election Results, INDEPENDENT ELECTION 
COMMISSION OF AFGHANISTAN, http://www.iec.org.af/pdf/finallist13/presidential.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 
2016) [hereinafter “IEC 2014”]; AFGHAN BIO, supra note 50; Biographies Of Afghan Personalities Of 
Yesterday And Today, AFGHANISTAN ONLINE, http://www.afghan-web.com/bios/; Afghanistan’s 
Presidential Elections: Power to the People, or the Powerful?, INT'L COUNCIL ON SECURITY AND DEV. 11–
17 (Mar. 2009), http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Elections/ICOS_elections.pdf [hereinafter, “ICOS”]; 
Tarkib Mawenan Namzedhai Intekhabat [The Composition of Vice-President Candidate], BBC, 
http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2009/07/090630_a-af-election-vice-president-candidates.shtml; 
Asia: Afghanistan Presidential Candidates 2014, GLOBAL VOICE (Mar. 27, 2014), https://iwpr.net/global-
voices/afghan-presidential-candidates-2014. 
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Candidate 1st Vice-President 2nd Vice-President Affiliations Total Votes
Hamid Karzai Ahmad Zia Masoud Mohammad Karim Khalili
Pashtun Tajik Hazara 
Mohammad Yunos Qanuni Taj Mohammad Wardak Sayyed Hosayn Alemi Balkhi
Tajik Pashtun Hazara
Mohammad Mohaqiq Nasir Ahmad Ensaf Abdul Fayaz Mehrayin
Hazara Pashtun Tajik
Abdul Rashid Dostum Shafiqa Habibi Mustafa Kamal Makhdom
Uzbek Pashtun Tajik
Candidate 1st Vice-President 2nd Vice-President Affiliations Total Votes
Hamid Karzai Mohammad Qasim Fahim Mohammad Karim Khalili
Pashtun Tajik Hazara
Dr. Abdullah Abdullah Homayon Shah Asefi Churagh Ali Ghuragh
Tajik (Mixed) Pashtun Hazara
Ramazan Bashardost Mohammad Mosa Barekzai Afifa Marof
Hazara Pashtun Tajik
Candidate 1st Vice-President 2nd Vice-President Affiliations Total Votes
Dr. Abdullah Abdullah Eng Muhammad Khan Haji Mohaqeq
Tajik* Pashtun Hazara
Ashraf Ghani Gen Abdulrashid Dostum Mohammad Sarwar Danish
Pashtun Uzbek Hazara
Zalmai Rasoul Ahmad Zia Masoud Habiba Sorabi
Pashtun Tajik Hazara
Abdulrab Rasul Sayaf Ismail Khan Abdul Wahab Erfan
Pashtun Tajik Uzbek
Qutbuddin Helal Enayatullah Enayat Mohammad Ali Nabizada
Pashtun Uzbek Tajik
Gul Agha Sherzai Sayyed Hussain Alemi BalkhiMohammad Hashem Zare
Pashtun Hazara Uzbek
Daud Sultanzoy Farid Ahmad Fazli Ms. Kazima Mohaqeq
Pashtun Tajik Hazara
Hedayat Amin Arsala General Khodaidad Ms. Safia Sediqi
Pashtun Hazara Pashtun
Abdul Rahim Wardak Shah Abdul Ahad Afzali Sayed Hussian Anwari 
Pashtun Tajik Hazara
Abdul Qayom Karzai Wahidullah Shahrani Mohammad Noor Akbari
Pashtun Uzbek Hazara
Sardar Mo'd Naeem Taj Mohammad Akbar Azizullah Puya
Pashtun Tajik Pashtun
Ethnicity
1.57%
Ethnicity
0.46%
Ethnicity
0.23%
Ethnicity
11.37%
Ethnicity
7.04%
Ethnicity
2.75%
 The Presidential Election of 2014: All Candidates
Ethnicity
45.00%
Ethnicity
31.56%
Independent
Ethnicity
30.59%
Ethnicity
10.46%
 The Presidential Election of 2004: Leading Candidates
Ethnicity
10.00%
 The Presidential Election of 2009: Leading Candidates
Ethnicity
11.70%
Ethnicity
49.67%
Independent
Party
Independent
Independent
Ethnic Composition of Presidential Teams
Ethnicity
55.40%
Ethnicity
16.30%
Independent
Coalition
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Party
Independent
Independent
Independent
Ethnicity Independent Withdrew
Ethnicity Independent Withdrew
Ethnicity Independent Withdrew
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The runoff system has centripetal effects
61
 on both voters and elites.
62
  
On the voter level, the runoff system encourages them to make a more 
informed choice in the second round
63
 since the voters’ freedom of choice is 
                                                        
61
  Centripetal effects are the political effects that indicate political moderation and cross-ethnic 
appealing rather than political or social polarization.  See REILLY, supra note 39, at 5–7.  
62
  Elgie, supra note 45, at 128; FARRELL, supra note 9, at 56, 60; Juan J. Linz, Presidential or 
Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?, in THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 21 
(Juan J. Linz & Arturo Valenzuela eds., 1992) (under a runoff system “those [candidates] tending more 
toward the extremes are aware of the limits of their strength.”) 
63
  GIOVANNI SARTORI, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING: AN INQUIRY INTO 
STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES, AND OUTCOMES 64 (1997); Sarah Birch, Two-Round Electoral Systems and 
Democracy, 36 COMP. POL. STUD. 319, 327 (2003). 
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restricted to front-running candidates.
64
  Many voters do not have their own 
ethnic candidates in the second round.  In effect, the voters have an 
opportunity to make a more politically informed choice, considering the 
policies and merits of the candidates.  Highlighting voters’ behavior, 
Giovanni Sartori described the runoff system as a two-shots system.
65
  With 
the first shot, a voter shoots pretty much in the dark; on the second shot, 
however, the voter shoots in full daylight.
66
  André Blais and coauthors, after 
arranging several experimental elections under a runoff system, concluded 
that extremist candidates have a zero percent chance of winning under 
majority-runoff.
67
  On the elites level, two-round elections create the 
potential for diverse interests to coalesce behind qualifying candidates in the 
second round.
68
  Eliminated candidates and parties have an opportunity to 
rally behind one front-runner or the other.
69
  Since moderate candidates are 
likely to have more coalitional appealing than their extremist counterparts, 
they are more likely to win the second round.  Examining runoffs in a 
number of countries, it appears that nowhere has the runoff rule led to 
extremist candidates winning, although political outsiders have been able to 
win the office.
70
  
While extremist candidates have not been able to win elections under 
a runoff system, this system does not eliminate the possibility that extremist 
candidates will make it onto the second ballot.  The extremist candidates 
advance to the second round either because there are more moderate 
candidates, who split centrist votes,
71
 or because moderates are squeezed by 
the left and right candidates, and therefore excluded from the second 
round.
72
  The Fair Vote Report describes how in Peru (2006) and in France 
(2002) the multiplicity of candidates led to radical candidates getting to the 
second round.
73
  For example, in the first round of 2006 election in Peru, the 
                                                        
64
  Sartori, supra note 26, at 63; Sartori, supra note 25, at 99. 
65
  Sartori, supra note 25, at 98. 
66
  See id. at 98. 
67
  André Blais et al., One-round vs. Two-round Elections: An Experimental Study, 5 FRENCH POL. 
278, 284 (2007). 
68
  See IDEA, supra note 28, at 53; Courtney, supra note 27, at 13. 
69
  See Courtney, supra note 27, at 13. 
70
  Although extremist candidates could be political outsiders, political outsiders are not necessarily 
extremists.  Political outsiders are primarily referred to as candidates who distinguish themselves from 
party politics.  See ANDREW E. BUSCH, OUTSIDERS AND OPENNESS: IN THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING 
SYSTEM, 22-26, 170–171 (1997).  Therefore, political outsiders might be anti-establishment, but not 
necessarily anti-system or anti-institutions.  
71
  See LEWIS, supra note 21, at 5. 
72
  Bouton & Gratton, supra note 29, at 286. 
73
  See LEWIS, supra note 21, at 5–6. 
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nationalist Ollanta Humala (30.7%) was far ahead of Alan Garcia (24.3%), a 
moderate candidate, since the moderate votes were split between Alan 
Garcia and Lordes Flores as well as others.
74
  Also, in the 2002 presidential 
election of France, Le Pen, an anti-immigration candidate, was able to finish 
second because the votes of moderates were split between six candidates.
75
  
Similarly, in the 1996 Russian Presidential election, a communist candidate, 
Gennadii Zyuganov, finished second to Boris Yeltsin by just a three percent 
margin (thirty-two percent to thirty-five percent).
76
  
Nonetheless, in the second round, the votes mostly move away from 
the extremist to the moderate candidates and coalitions.
77
  In all 
abovementioned elections, the moderate candidates were able to harbor the 
support of the backers of eliminated candidates and eventually win the 
runoff.
78
  Therefore, even though the runoff rule allows advancement of 
extremist candidates to the second round, this system, unlike the plurality 
rule, prevents the election of radical or anti-system candidates.
79
  For this 
very reason, the runoff system is known for reducing political extremism.
80
  
To date, no extremist candidate has made it to the second round in 
Afghan presidential elections.  Hamid Karzai, the winner of the 2004
81
 and 
2009 elections,
82
  Abdullah Abdullah, the runner up in 2009
83
 and a front-
runner in the 2014 election,
84
 and Ashraf Ghani, the current president,
85
 have 
all demonstrated moderate behavior and strong capabilities for building 
cross-ethnic alliances.  For example, in 2004 and 2009, in addition to 
choosing his vice presidents from two different ethnic groups, Karzai was 
able to make alliances with a large number of elites from different ethnic 
groups.
86
  Abdullah’s tickets also represented three ethnic groups in both the 
                                                        
74
  See id. at 5. 
75
  See id. at 6. 
76
  Norris, supra note 20, at 4. 
77
  Duverger, Which is the Best Electoral System?, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES 
AND ALTERNATIVES 38 (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman, eds., 1984); see also David Goldey & Philip 
Williams, France, in DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR POLITICAL 
CONSEQUENCES, 65–67 (Vernon Bogdanor & David Butler eds., 1983); Courtney, supra note 27, at 13; 
Bordignon, supra note 19, at 1. 
78
  See LEWIS, supra note 21, at 5–6. 
79
  See Birch, supra note 61, at 325; Fabrice Lehoucq, Costa Rica: Modifying Majoritarianism with 
40 per cent Threshold, in HANDBOOK OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM CHOICE 133 (Josep M. Colomer ed., 2004). 
80
  Bordignon, supra note 19, at 2; Courtney, supra note 27, at 14. 
81
  IEC 2004, supra note 60.  
82
  IEC 2009, supra note 60. 
83
  See id. 
84
  IEC 2014, supra note 60. 
85
  Id. 
86
  See Mobasher, supra note 3, 375, 378–9. 
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2009 and 2014 presidential elections.
87
  In addition to his tri-ethnic 
presidential tickets, in both elections he officially established broad-based 
coalitions comprised of elites and parties from diverse ethnic groups.
88
  
Similarly, Ghani’s presidential ticket represented an alliance of three groups: 
a Pashtun, an Uzbek, and a Hazara.
89
  To include a Tajik representative at 
the highest level of his government, he appointed Ahmad Zia Masoud as his 
Special Envoy for Good Governance with the same level of authority and 
benefits as his vice presidents.
90
  
II. THE RUNOFF CLAUSE AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF CROSS-ETHNIC 
COALITIONS 
While demonstrating the potential to encourage cross-ethnic alliances, 
the runoff clause has remained an unwelcoming system for the 
institutionalization of these coalitions.
91
  Many coalitions either dissolve or 
reformulate during elections; some others split immediately after elections.
92
  
Most of them are built on the basis of patronage and personal politics while 
lacking titles, structures, and ideologies.
93
  Notably, their number is on the 
rise, indicating a trend resembling party fragmentation in Afghanistan.  
Table III.  This table shows how many coalitions survived, partly 
survived, reformulated, or ceased to exist before, during, and after 
elections.  The data is collected from a number of sources cited in the 
footnote.
94
  This table only includes some officially established 
coalitions as well as some informal coalitions, which are large and 
popular.  Reformulation happens when coalitions renew their members, 
titles, and objectives.  Partly survived coalitions are the ones that a 
number of elites or party members split. 
                                                        
87
  See id. at 380–81, 402–05. 
88
  See id.  
89
  See id. at 407.  In 2009, however, when Ghani was not a popular candidate, he appointed a 
Pashtun, Mohammad Ayob Rafiqi, as his first vice president.  See Ayob Aryan, Tarkib Mawenan 
Namzedhai Intekhabat: Numad Kasrat Garayee? [The Composition of Vice-President Candidate: A Sign of 
Pluralism?], BBC (Jun. 4, 2009), http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2009/07/090630_a-af-election-
vice-president-candidates.shtml. 
90
  Dr. Ghani even promised to amend the Constitution and appoint him as his third vice president.  
See Ahmad Qureshi, Ghani promises to make Massoud 3rd VP, AFGHAN PAZHWAK NEWS (May 26, 2014), 
http://www.elections.pajhwok.com/en/2014/05/26/ghani-promises-make-massoud-3rd-vp. 
91
  The runoff rule has also been associated with (i) being conducive to preference and information 
revelation and (ii) ensuring a large mandate to the winner, thereby being more democratic.  See Bouton, 
supra note 29, at 284; see Blais, supra note 40, at 193–97; Courtney, supra note 27, at 13. 
92
  A good example of coalitions ceasing to exist after elections is Karzai’s team.  After almost 
fourteen years in office, Karzai no longer represents any coalition or party.  
93
  See Mobasher, supra note 3. 
94
  Supra note 52. 
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Many studies suggest that the runoff system leads to party 
fragmentation and multifactionalism.
95
  This system has a very complicated 
relationship with coalition formation and consolidation.  Despite theoretical 
advances, the conventional literature does not adequately account for how 
this system encourages the development of broad coalitions yet at the same 
time those coalitions remain unstable and crumbling under this system.  
Sartori, in his book Comparative Constitutional Engineering, posits that the 
effects of the runoff rule on the development of parties and coalitions cannot 
be predicted with any precision.
96
  Damien Bol, André Blais, and their 
colleagues called this complication a “mystery” of the runoff system.  After 
conducting some experimental elections under the runoff rule, they 
                                                        
95
  See, e.g., V.O. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS, 420 (1949); Birch, supra note 61, at 324; Mainwaring & 
Shugart, supra note 52, at 467; SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 213–214; Courtney, supra note 27, at 
15; B.C. Canon, Factionalism in the South: A test of theory and a Revisitation of V.O. Key, 22 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 833, 845 (1978); Byron Criddle, Electoral Systems in France, 45 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 108, 109 
(1992); Aurel Croissant & Philip Volkel, Party System Types and Party System Institutionalization: 
Comparing New Democracies in East and Southeast Asia, 18 PARTY POLITICS 235, 255–256 (2012); 
Stephen G. Wright & William H. Riker, Plurality and runoff systems and numbers of candidates, 60 
PUBLIC CHOICE 155, 163 (1989). 
96
  SARTORI, supra note 63, at 67. 
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emphasized that while this rule presumably should reduce the number of 
candidates (parties and coalitions), in reality it does not.
97
 
One explanation for this puzzle focuses on the first round of elections, 
analyzing voting behaviors
98
 in this round.
99
  For instance, Maurice 
Duverger,
100
 Garry Cox,
101
 William Riker,
102
 and César Martilini
103
 observe 
that in the first round, the voters tend to vote sincerely since they have the 
chance to make strategic decisions in the second round.
104
  This theory is 
based on the assumption that candidates react to voters’ behavior, implying 
that candidates make their entry decisions on the basis of the electoral 
tendencies of voters.
105
  Since there are no (or few) bandwagon voters
106
 
under the runoff system, more candidates are likely to run.
107
  In effect, the 
runoff system discourages fewer candidates and the fusion of their 
                                                        
97
  Damien Bol et al., Electoral System and Number of Candidates: Candidate Entry under Plurality 
and Majority Runoff 20 (Paris School of Economics, Working Paper No. 2015-20, 2015), 
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01168722/document. 
 A great number of scholars including Bol and Blais imply that the number of candidates is 
equivalent to the number of parties or coalitions in presidential elections and so they focus their analysis on 
the number of candidates.  See id. at 1; Jakub Zielinski, Translating Social Cleavages into Party Systems: 
The Significance of New Democracies, 54 WORLD POL., 184, 197–98 (2002); Wright, supra note 95, at 160, 
176; Matt Golder, Presidential coattails and legislative fragmentation, 50 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 34, 34–48 
(2006); Matthew Shugart & Rein Taagepera, Plurality Versus Majority Election of Presidents: A Proposal 
for a “Double Complement Rule”, 27 COMP. POL. STUD. 323 (1994); Peter Buisseret, Entry Deterrence 
Under Run-Off Rules 1(2015) (Working Paper); Courtney, supra note 27, at 15. 
98
  Voting behavior indicates an individual’s voting choices based on that person’s interests and 
values as well as “judgment[s] about the various candidates’ chances of winning.”  See André Blais et al., 
Strategic Vote Choice in One-round and Two-round Elections: An Experimental Study, 64 POL. RES. Q. 
637, 637 (2011).  If a voter casts her vote merely on the basis of her preference, it is called sincere voting.  
However, if a voter casts her vote on the basis of the viability of a candidate, it is regarded as strategic 
voting.  Virtually, in every formal model the assumption is that the voter votes either sincerely or 
strategically.  See Fujiwara, supra note 25, at 198. 
99
  COX, supra note 54, at 124; Fujiwara, supra note 25, at 200 (FN 7); Bordignon, supra note 19, at 
1. 
100
  DUVERGER, supra note 77, at 240. 
101
  COX, supra note 54, at 124. 
102
  William H. Riker, The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of 
Political Science, 76 AM. J. POL. SCI. REV. 753 (1982). 
103
  César Martinelli, Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters, 19 SOC. 
CHOICE AND WELFARE  901 (2002). 
104
  See also Matthew Sobert Shugart & Scott Mainwaring, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin 
America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate, in PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 
123 (Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., 1997); Thomas Piketty, Voting As 
Communicating, 67 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 169, 169–191(2000). 
105
  See Fujiwara, supra note 25, at 199, 228; see also Bol, supra note 97, at 6; Van Der Straeten, 
supra note 19, at 1–2. 
106
  “Bandwagon voter” as opposed to “sincere voter” refers to the voter who votes strategically, 
deserting the preferred candidate in favor of a more viable one.  See Fujiwara, supra note 25, at 202. 
107
  Duverger, supra note 77; Riker, supra note 102. 
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supporters into larger coalitions.
108
  However, Afghan presidential elections 
challenge this theory because the results of these elections have indicated 
that the tendency for strategic voting
109
 is considerably high among 
voters.
110
 
Indeed, all three Afghan presidential elections demonstrated that a 
runoff system has as much of a bandwagon effect as a plurality system 
does.
111
  For example, in the 2004 election, of the eighteen candidates, only 
four dominated the polls, leaving their counterparts with less than one 
percent of votes each.
112
  In 2009, the three leading candidates won almost 
ninety-one percent of votes, letting the other twenty-nine candidates share 
the rest.
113
  Similarly, in the first round of the 2014 elections, the three 
leading candidates won nearly eighty-eight percent, while the rest shared the 
remaining twelve percent of votes.
114
  The following table shows the 
difference between the average votes of each leading candidate from those 
of non-viable candidates in all three presidential elections.  
Table IV.  This table compares the average votes received by 
leading candidates and those of the rest.  The average votes are 
calculated on the basis of election results produced on the Electoral 
Commission website.
115
 
  
                                                        
108
  A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, GOVERNMENTS AND PARTIES IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE, 110 (1896). 
109
  Gary Cox defines strategic voting as the electoral behavior that “rational voters eschew wasting 
their votes on hopeless candidacies, preferring instead to transfer their support to some candidate with a 
serious chance of winning.”  See COX, supra note 54, at 30.  According to Aron Kiss, “Strategic voting 
occurs when an individual votes for an alternative that is not her most preferred one in the belief that this is 
a better way to achieve the best realistically possible outcome in the election.”  See Aron Kiss, Identifying 
Strategic Voting in Two-Round Elections, 1 (2012) (Working Paper), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379415001560. 
 Nonetheless, in a divided society, the viability of a candidate is not the only reason for voting 
strategically as ethnic groups might tend to showcase their strength through voting strategically for one of 
their own candidates, even though that candidate is less likely to win a nationwide election.  
110
  Mobasher, supra note 3, at 367–69. 
111
  “Bandwagon effect,” in an electoral context, refers to the situation where the electorates prefer to 
vote for the most viable candidates in order to make their votes count.  See Fujiwara, supra note 25, at 203. 
112
  See IEC 2004, supra note 60. 
113
  See IEC 2009, supra note 60. 
114
  See IEC 2014, supra note 60. 
115
  IEC 2004, supra note 60; IEC 2009, supra note 60; IEC 2014, supra note 60. 
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On average, each leading candidate shared between 23% to 30% of 
the votes, while the shares of deserted candidates ranged from 0.3% to 2.4% 
in the last three presidential elections.  This huge gap between the vote share 
of leading candidates and others indicates that voters do vote strategically in 
the first round.
116
  This finding is consistent with the findings of some 
scholars such as Laurent Bouton,
117
 Gabriele Gratton,
118
 Daniel Prinz,
119
 
Blais,
120
 and Damien Bol,
121
 who also dispelled the assumption of the 
absence of strategic voting under the runoff system.
122
  André Blais and his 
colleagues conducted an experiment comparing strategic voting under 
plurality and runoff rules.
123
  Their experiment indicated that the voters had 
as much incentive to vote strategically in a Two Round Election as in a One 
Round Election.
124
  By this analysis, unstable coalitions are not the likely 
consequence of the lack of strategic voting under the runoff system.
125
  
                                                        
116
 This finding also challenges the conventional literature that strategic voting does not exist in 
divided societies since voters follow the instructions of their elites and are likely to vote for their own 
candidates.  See Janet Landa et al., Ethnic Voting Patterns: A Case Study of Metropolitan Toronto, 14 POL. 
GEOGRAPHY 435, 435 (1995); COX, supra note 54, at 15–16, 44, 83–85; MARTINE VAN BIJLERT, HOW TO 
WIN AN AFGHAN ELECTION: PERCEPTIONS AND PRACTICES 2, 15 (2009); MOSER, supra note 70, at 24–25, 
30 ; also see Robert G. Moser et al., Social Diversity Affects the Number of Parties Even under First-Past-
the-Post Rules, Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n 2011 Ann. Meeting Paper (2011).  This conventional understanding of 
strategic voting did not account for the most likely situation in divided societies where voters engage in 
intra-ethnic voting coordination and defection: they defect from one of their ethnic candidates in favor of 
the another from the same group. 
 Mobasher, in his article Understanding Ethnic-Electoral Dynamics, has demonstrated that the 
“tendency for the intra-ethnic [strategic voting] is considerably high among all ethnic groups and in all 
Presidential elections . . . [E]thnic groups tend to vote collectively for their most viable candidates and 
defect from the others. . . . This electoral behavior is very similar to strategic voting in consolidated 
democracies where a left wing supporter is more likely to defect from a losing left candidate for a more 
viable [left candidate] but is less likely to defect from a losing left wing candidate to vote for a right wing 
candidate.”  See Mobasher, supra note 3, at 368. 
117
  Bouton, supra note 27. 
118
  Id. at 283. 
119
  Daniel Prinz, Strategic Voting, Mixed and Runoff Elections: Evidence from Hungary, 4 (Mar. 30 
2013) (Working Paper) 
https://www.brown.edu/academics/economics/sites/brown.edu.academics.economics/files/uploads/Daniel%
20Prinz%20thesis.pdf. 
120
  Blais, supra note 67, at 278–86. 
121
  Bol et al., supra note 97, at 12. 
122
  Under the runoff rule, the voters have the incentive to vote strategically because they fear that 
voting sincerely might result in two candidates in the second round that do not represent their interests and 
preferences at all, or that a rival candidate wins the first round flat out.  See id. at 7. 
123
  The purpose of Blais and his colleagues’ experiment was to determine whether voters behave 
differently in the two voting systems, given the same set of options, and whether these behaviors yield 
different outcomes as Duverger indicated.  The same group of people voted in both elections.  They had 
exactly the same set of options: five candidates with the same positions.  Blais and his colleagues 
concluded that voters voted strategically under both electoral systems.  See Blais, supra note 67, at 278–89. 
124
  See Blais, supra note 67, at 278–89. 
125
  Blais, supra note 40, at 193. 
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Some scholars draw attention to the influence of the runoff system on 
candidates’ strategies independent from voters’ behavior. 126   Blais and 
Indridason criticize the literature for the lack of attention to candidates’ 
electoral strategies,
127
 since an electoral system influences not only voters’ 
behavior but also candidates’ and parties’ behavior.128  Indeed the candidates 
(and their political allies) have more at stake in elections than voters, which 
is winning or losing political power.  Accordingly, candidates are more 
invested in influencing the elections and alliances than voters.  As such, 
candidates’ strategies are more instrumental than voters’ strategies in 
shaping parties and coalitions.
129
  Therefore, analyzing candidates’ coalition-
building strategies may better explain why the runoff system thwarts the 
consolidation of coalitions.  
Ensuring a possible second round, the runoff system provides enough 
incentives for not one but three categories of candidates to enter the 
competition: the first group is the “office seekers” who need to follow a 
winning strategy of making alliances across ethnic groups.  The largest 
coalitions in the first round are formed by this category of candidates.  The 
second category of candidates that the runoff system encourages is what I 
call “patronage-seekers” who enter the fray for some benefit other than 
winning.  These benefits include patronage for small parties and candidates, 
especially if they win a considerable number of votes in the first round.
130
  
Indeed, in Afghanistan, many candidates run to raise enough votes to 
increase their political capital for bargaining with runner-ups in the second 
round.
131
  The more votes they receive, the better bargaining power they gain 
for patronage with front-running coalitions.  Some candidates enter the race 
only as spoilers, splitting the votes of viable candidates
132
 for different 
reasons, including forcing a second round election.
133
  For these 
opportunistic reasons, this category of candidates has little incentive to pull 
                                                        
126
  See id.; Blais, supra note 67, at 280. 
127
  Blais, supra note 40, at 193. 
128
  Blais, supra note 67, at 280. 
129
  Blais, supra note 40, at 193. 
130
  Elgie, supra note 45, at 123. 
131
  BIJLERT, supra note 116, at 9.  Some scholars found similar tendencies in candidates in other 
countries.  See SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 210, 225; Bol, supra note 97, at 22–23; Mark P. 
Jones, Electoral Laws and the Effective Number of Candidates in Presidential Elections, 61 J. POLITICS 
172, 176 (1999). 
132
  See BIJLERT, supra note 116, at 9. Some scholars found similar tendencies in candidates in other 
countries.  See COX, supra note 54, at 158; Mainwaring, supra note 52, at 467. 
133
  SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 216. 
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out in favor of more viable candidates in the first round.
134
  Indeed, they 
follow a blackmail strategy in the first round for more beneficial alliance 
making in the second round.
135
  In that effort, they tend to form their own 
coalitions and distinguishable constituencies, although their coalitions 
remain informal, personalistic, and small.
136
  
The third category of candidates that the runoff system incentivizes is 
the “runoff-seekers.”137   These are serious, but not necessarily the most 
viable, candidates who run in the first round with a hope that they may be 
able to finish as the runner up.
138
  Their strategy is forcing a second round 
while finishing as a runner up.
139
  Finishing as a runner up allows them to 
compete with the front-runner, having the chance of winning the alliance 
and vote shares of the losing candidates.
140
  The success of the second place 
candidate is more probable when a majority of voters dislike the top finisher, 
or when, in a divided society, the top finisher is from a minority group, 
assuming votes are ethnic-based.
141
  Indeed, one of the reasons for 
                                                        
134
  They tend to establish themselves as the main figures in their constituencies.  See id. at 255; Bol, 
supra note 97, at 23. 
135
  Mainwaring, supra note 52, at 467. 
136
  Most of these coalitions do not have any objectives other than competing in the elections.  Many 
are so small—merely the alliance of president and vice president candidates—that their formation remains 
unknown to the media and public.  As mentioned earlier, this study does not include those coalitions.  
137
  Here, runoff in the context of “runoff-seekers” means the second round.  Therefore, runoff-seekers 
are the candidates who would like to force a second round, in which they are one of the front-runners. 
 Thomas Fujiwara notes in his article, A Regression Discontinuity Test of Strategic Voting and 
Duverger’s Law, that some parties and candidates enter the race in order to finish third.  He, however, does 
not explain why would a party or candidate would bear the cost of finishing third in an election, where only 
two candidates can qualify in the second round.  It seems to be his version of the interpretation of 
Duverger’s hypothesis.  See Fujiwara, supra note 25, at 215.  Finishing third, however, does not seem to 
benefit a candidate unless either a second round allows three candidates to compete or the candidate wants 
to raise his political capital for bargaining against the front runners in the second round, which in that case 
the candidate is categorized as opportunist in this article.  
138
  COX, supra note 54, at 158; SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 210; Mainwaring, supra note 
52, at 467. 
139
  See Mainwaring, supra note 52, at 467. 
140
  SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 215–16. 
141
  See id. at 216. 
 In this situation, some also argue that political outsiders might gain the chance of prevailing over 
the first round frontrunner.  See Birch, supra note 63, at 325; SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 215.  
Political outsiders are primarily referred to as candidates who distinguish themselves from party politics.  It 
is not, however, a clear-cut definition since some candidates might run as a party nominee but prefer to 
establish themselves as political outsiders and are regarded as such by voters and politicians.  A very recent 
example of that is Donald Trump who, while running as a Republican in the 2016 presidential election in 
the US, prefers to portray himself as an outsider.  Political outsiders are likely to run a populist and anti-
establishment campaign.  See BUSCH, supra note 70, at 22–26, 154, 170–71. 
 There have been some cases where political outsiders became the eventual winner in the second 
round.  Twice in Peru, political outsiders were able to force a second round, in which they eventually won 
against frontrunners.  Also in Poland, a political outsider succeeded in his strategy of finishing second in 
the first round, though he lost the second round to the top finisher.  See SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, 
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Abdullah’s lead of the candidates in 2014’s first round was the split of 
Pashtun votes among seven different Pashtun candidates.
142
  A survey before 
the second round of the 2014 election indicated that Ghani’s votes among 
Pashtuns would increase from forty-nine percent in the first round to 
seventy-five percent in the second round.
143
  
The conventional literature failed to accurately predict the upper 
bounds of parties and coalitions because they failed to account for one or 
more of the categories of candidates and therefore under-predicted the 
number of candidates.  For instance, the formula M+1, which was suggested 
by Garry Cox and other political scientists, falls short of predicting the upper 
bounds of parties and coalitions in a runoff system because it does not 
account for patronage-seeking candidates.
144
  In this formula, M refers to the 
number of candidates that face off in the second round;
145
 and so it is 
hypothesized that the runoff system should reduce the number of candidates 
to three parties in the long run.
146
  Predictably, this upper bound does not 
even come close to reflecting the long lists of candidates that ran in the 2004 
election (eighteen candidates),
147
 the 2009 election (initially forty-four 
candidates),
148
 or the 2014 election (initially eleven candidates)
149
 in 
Afghanistan.
150
  Some recent studies examining the runoff rules in different 
countries with longer experiences of runoff elections also indicated that the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
at 33, 215.  Encouraging a political outsider as a main contender is in itself a fragmenting characteristic of 
the runoff rule, considering the fact that they join the contest as a new contender challenging the 
established coalitions either as a leader of a new movement and alliance or as a populist independent.  More 
importantly, political outsiders have less experience and less ability to building coalitions in the assembly.  
See id. at 22–33, 170–71, 215. 
142
  See Mobasher, supra note 3, at 384–85 
143
  The same survey also demonstrated that most supporters of losing candidates would vote for 
Ghani in the second round.  See Afghan’s Future Survey: Afghanistan’s Ethnic, Regional Divisions 
Produce a Dead Heat in its Presidential Race, LANGER RESEARCH ASSOCIATES 1, 5 (2014), 
http://www.langerresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/Afghanistan-Election_ACSOR-Langer.pdf. 
144
  M+1 is an extension of Duverger’s Law to the runoff system.  M+1 indicates that eventually 
strategic coordination would lead to first round elections, where one additional candidate would compete 
with the M number of candidates—which is most often two candidates—that qualify for the second round 
election.  See COX, supra note 54, at 123; Shugart & Mainwaring, supra note 104, at 406; SHUGART & 
CAREY, supra note 42, at 300; Wright, supra note 95, at 159–60. 
145
  See COX, supra note 54, at 123; Shugart & Mainwaring, supra note 104, at 406; SHUGART & 
CAREY, supra note 42, at 300; Wright, supra note 95, at 159–60. 
146
  See COX, supra note 54, at 123–24; Shugart & Mainwaring supra note 104, at 406; Bouton, supra 
note 29, at 283; Van Der Straeten, supra note 19, at 9. 
147
  IEC 2004, supra note 60. 
148
 The initial list of candidates for the 2009 presidential election is in KABUL PRESS, 
http://kabulpress.org/my/IMG/pdf/presidential.pdf. 
149
  IEC 2014, supra note 60. 
150
  Some factors other than the electoral system might also affect the number of candidates.  These 
factors might include ballot access, open entry, filing fees, petition requirements, succession rules, 
incumbency, local party strength, and fragmentation of parties.  See Wright, supra note 95, at 165. 
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runoff system is associated with far more than three candidates.
151
  In many 
countries, the average number of runners under the runoff system is over 
five candidates (coalitions).
152
  
In addition, by ensuring the possibility of a second round election, the 
runoff system postpones much of the bargaining and coalition building to the 
second round.
153
  In fact, the runoff system invokes two rounds of coalitions: 
proactive coalitions and second round coalitions.
154
  The proactive coalitions 
form before the first round elections and the second round coalitions strike 
when eliminated candidates join with the ones competing in a runoff.
155
  The 
proactive coalitions are a combination of catchall (oversized) coalitions on 
the part of serious candidates and fragmented coalitions on the part of 
opportunist candidates.  Hence, the first round elections experience a large 
number of coalitions.  Notably, the presence of a large number of coalitions 
compels serious candidates to form oversized—and therefore less 
cohesive—coalitions to win.156  
The second round coalitions, which are common under runoff rules, 
are even more disruptive to coalition consolidation in general because these 
coalitions stem from the dissolving of proactive coalitions and the 
reconfiguration of the others.
157
  In these coalitions the losing alliances 
regroup with front-running coalitions, which suggests that no coalition 
remains intact within each presidential election.
158
  
                                                        
151
  See Bol, supra note 97, at 20; Wright, supra note 95, at 161–62; Birch, supra note 63, at 323–24; 
Mainwaring, supra note 52, at 467; SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 212–14; Courtney, supra note 27, 
at 15; Croissant, supra note 95, at 255–56. 
152
  Wright, supra note 95, at 162. 
153
  See Kaare Strom, Ian Budge, & Michael J. Laver, Constraints on Cabinet Formation in 
Parliamentary Democracies, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 303, 316 (May 1994); SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, 
at 216; Linz, supra note 30, at 57. 
154
  SARTORI, supra note 63, at 166; Blais, supra note 40, at 194. 
155
  See Blais, supra note 40, at 193. 
156
  Afghan presidential elections have shown that serious candidates, in order to form a winning 
coalition and neutralize the effects of multiplicity of candidates in their constituencies, make coalitions with 
a variety of political groups and elites.  For instance, in the presidential election of 2009, Karzai, in addition 
to forming an alliance of parties and political groups, entered into bargains with a large number of elites 
offering patronage.  First, “he persuaded some strong Pashtun contenders such as Gul Agha Shirzai (then 
governor of Nangarhar) and Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi (the head of a Pashtun nationalist party) not to run 
against him.”  See Mobasher, supra note 3, at 378–79.  “In the meantime, by introducing two prominent 
Tajik and Hazara strongmen—Marshal Qasim Fahim and Karim Khalili— as his [running mates], Karzai 
attempted to draw cross-ethnic votes.”  Id.  In addition, he made a coalition with Mohaqiq, the most 
prominent leader of Hazaras, and Dostom, a well-known Uzbek leader.  See id. 
157
  SARTORI, supra note 63, at 166; Blais, supra note 40, at 194. 
158
  Courtney, supra note 27, at 14; Bordignon, supra note 19, at 14; Resnick, supra note 52, at 739. 
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The fact that runoff systems provide a secondary benefit for 
candidates, which is normally patronage, leaves coalitions even more 
vulnerable to instability.  Patronage coalitions are not coalitions of 
commitment
159
 or permanent coalitions
160
 but rather coalitions of 
convenience
161
 where an alliance sustains as long as all parties benefit from 
their coalescence.  It is not surprising that immediately after the first round 
of the 2014 election, the eliminated coalitions split into several factions so 
that their members joined the second round contenders on their own terms.  
This constant grouping and regrouping of alliances, which the runoff system 
instigates, offers little chance of coalition solidification.
162
  The following 
table illustrates how first round running mates split and eventually joined the 
rival front-runners in the 2014 runoff. 
                                                        
159
  Following Donald Horowitz’s taxonomy, a coalition of commitment is the one that is formed not 
only to win elections and government power but also to implement a somehow coherent policy that is 
ideologically shared by its members.  See HOROWITZ, supra note 33, at 366. 
160
  A permanent coalition is the one that tends to survive even if it loses elections and government 
power.  See id. 
161
  Coalition in convenience is the one that is formed for a particular purpose, most often that of 
winning elections and the government.  See id.  
162
  Linz, supra note 62, at 22 (“The expectation of a runoff increases the incentive to compete in the 
first round either in the hope of placing among the two most favored or of gaining bargaining power for 
support in the runoff of one of the two leading contenders.  Therefore, rather than favoring a coalescence of 
parties behind a candidate, the system reinforces the existing fragmentation.”). 
Adding to these issues, second round elections often encourage boycott by candidates and their 
supporters.  See Birch, supra note 63, at 326.  For instance, in Serbia in 2002, the defeated candidates 
boycotted the second round election, lowering the turnout by half.  See OSCE/ODIHR Election 
Observation Mission: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, ORG. FOR SEC. AND CO-
OPERATION EUROPE (Oct. 13, 2002), http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/serbia/15327?download=tr ue.  
Also in Niger, in 2016, the opposition coalition with 17% of the vote dropped out of the runoff although the 
candidate was running from behind the bar. See Opposition coalition to boycott Niger runoff poll, 
ALJAZEERA (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/opposition-coalition-boycott-niger-
runoff-poll-160309050119175.html.  
Similarly, in Afghanistan, several candidates boycotted the presidential elections in 2004 and 2009.  
See Colin Freeman, Afghan election fiasco as Karzai rivals pull out over fraud claims, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 
10, 2004), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/Afghanistan/14 73809/Afghan-election-fiasco-
as-Karzai-rivals-pull-out-over-fraud-claims.html; See also Jon Boone, Afghanistan election challenger 
Abdullah Abdullah pulls out of runoff, GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2009), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/01/afghan-election-karzai-abdullah.  In multi-ethnic 
Afghanistan, sometimes these electoral boycotts not only lead to electoral deadlock, but also tend to 
instigate ethnic tensions.  Boycott of the runoff elections by Dr. Abdullah in both 2009 and 2014 led to 
ethnic tensions. 
 The runoff system has also been criticized for being costly and exhausting as well as responsible 
for the lower turnout rates.  See Lakeman, supra note 24, at 53; Courtney, supra note 27, at 14.  It is costly 
for both the government and voters, as well as for candidates.  See LEWIS, supra note 21, at 2.  Also, most 
voters do not turnout in the second round, which leads to the winner gaining fewer votes than he had in the 
first round.  See Lakeman, supra note 24, at 53; LEWIS, supra note 21, at 2–3.  
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Table V.  This table illustrates losing candidates’ ticket splits in 
the 2014 election before the second round.
163
 
 
 
The table shows that from six presidential tickets, only two 
collectively joined one of the two front-running coalitions; four other 
presidential tickets split immediately after the first round, with some 
members joining Abdullah’s campaign and others endorsing Ghani.164  The 
presidential teams that withdrew early in the first round also split between 
frontrunners.  For example, Qayum Karzai endorsed Ghani while his first 
running mate, Shahrani, supported Abdullah; somewhat similarly, while 
                                                        
163
  The data was collected from a number of sources, including Alissa J. Rubin, Front-Runner in 
Afghan Election Secures a Key Ally, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/12/world/a sia/abdullah-abdullah-afghanistan-presidential-election-
coalition.html; Sayed Tariq Majid, Ashraf Ghani, Ahmad Zia Find Common Ground, TOLONEWS (May 25, 
2015), http://www.tolonews.com/en/ election-2014/14997-ashraf-ghani-ahmad-zia-find-common-ground; 
Frud Bezhan, Afghan Election: Numbers Stacked Against Ashraf Ghani, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY 
(Jun. 3, 2014), http://www.rferl.org/content/afghan-election-ghani-numbers/25409182.html; Maria Abi-
Habib & Habib Khan Totakhil, Afghan Presidential Front-Runner Gets More Backing, WALL ST. J. (June 
3, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/afghan-presidential-front-runner-gets-more-backing-1401812198; 
Associated Foreign Press, Former warlord joins Abdullah in Afghan election, EXPRESS TRIBUNE (May 3, 
2014), http://tribune.com.pk/story/703684/former-warlord-joins-abdullah-in-afghan-election/; Roya 
Ibrahimi, Daoud Sultanzoy Endorses Ashraf Ghani, TOLONEWS (May 21, 2014), 
http://www.tolonews.com/en /afghanistan/14936-daoud-sultanzoy-endorses-ashraf-ghani; Saleha Sadat, 
Female Elites Back Abdullah, TOLONEWS (June 5, 2014), http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/15134-
female-elites-back-abdullah; Sonil Hidari, Arsala Endorses Ghani, TOLONEWS (June 9, 2014), 
http://www.tolonews. com/en/afghanistan/15181-hedayat-amin-arsala-endorses-ghani-in-runoff. 
164
  Id.  
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Rahim Wardak stepped down without backing any candidate, his second 
running mate embraced Ghani’s campaign.165  
One major flaw that the runoff system has been charged with, 
particularly in divided societies, is that it hinders smaller groups from 
winning presidential office.
166
  As to the case of Afghanistan, Kenneth 
Katzman concluded that the “electoral system . . . strongly favors the 
likelihood that the president will always be an ethnic Pashtun.”167  The three 
presidential elections (2004, 2009, and 2014) in Afghanistan have led to 
Pashtun candidates becoming presidents, although the results of the 2014 
elections were too unsettled to confirm a legitimate winner.  Indeed, in the 
first round of the 2014 election, Abdullah, a Tajik candidate, was the front-
runner.
168
  
The runoff system has also been criticized for being prone to ethnic 
tensions and even political violence.  For example, in countries such as 
Angola (1992), Algeria (1992), Congo (1993), Macedonia (1994), Togo 
(1994), and Haiti (1995), the losing candidates canceled the elections and 
resorted to violence against the potential winners in the second round.
169
  To 
this effect, some scholars argue that the runoff system creates a culture of 
wait and see, where the losing parties might resort to violence.
170
  In 
Afghanistan too, the boycott of the runoff elections by Abdullah in both 
2009 and 2014 led to ethnic tensions.
171
  Particularly in the 2014 runoff, the 
ethnic tensions brought Afghanistan to the brink of a civil war.
172
  Therefore, 
                                                        
165
  Ghanizada, Qayum Karzai endorses Dr. Ashraf Ghani in election runoff, KHAAMA PRESS (June 8, 
2014), http://www.khaama.com/qayum-karzai-endoses-dr-ashraf-ghani-in-election-runoff-8233; Saleha 
Sadat, Endorsements Keep Rolling for Abdullah, TOLONEWS (June 6, 2014), 
http://elections.tolonews.com/node/4166; Ghanizada, Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak withdraws from 
presidential election, KHAAMA PRESS (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.khaama.com/gen-abdul-rahim-wardak-
withdraws-from-presidential-election-2884; Anwari, Sayed Hussain died in India because of cancer, 
AFGHAN BIOGRAPHIES (July 6, 2016), http://www.afghan-bios.info/index.php?option=com 
_afghanbios&id=3475&task=view&total=3293&start=332&Itemid=2. 
166
  AREND LIJPHART, THINKING ABOUT DEMOCRACY: POWER SHARING AND MAJORITY RULE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 184, 186 (2008); STEIN ROKKAN, CITIZENS, ELECTION, PARTIES: APPROACHES TO 
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE PROCESSES OF DEVELOPMENT 157 (1970). 
167
  KATZMAN, supra note 12, at 7. 
168
  IEC 2014, supra note 60. 
169
  See REYNOLDS, supra note 28, at 53; see also Birch, supra note 63, at 327. 
170
  See REYNOLDS, supra note 28, at 53; see also Birch, supra note 63, at 327. 
171
  Shamshad Pasarlay et al., Reforming the Afghan Electoral System: The Current Debate and its 
Implications for the Plans to Amend the Afghan Constitution, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG, (May 8, 2015), 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/05/reforming-the-afghan-electoral-system-the-current-debate-and-its-
implications-for-the-plans-to-amend-the-afghan-constitution/#more-4123. 
172
  Id.  
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two-round elections can have a serious potential for electoral boycott and 
ethnic tensions. 
III. VARIATIONS, ALTERNATIVES, AND ANCILLARIES  
Since the failure of the 2014 presidential election, efforts began to 
reform the Constitution and electoral laws in order to put an end to ethnic 
tensions that tend to ensue during and after elections.
173
  However, the 
ongoing legal and political discourse on reforming the electoral laws has 
centered on changing only the parliamentary electoral system.
174
  This article 
is the first attempt to extend the discourse to reforming the presidential 
electoral rules, as presidential elections have failed to institutionalize cross-
ethnic coalitions and prevent ethnic tensions.  
Donald Horowitz, in his groundbreaking book Ethnic Groups in 
Conflict, writes that under a proper electoral system, a presidential election 
should be an optimal conflict-regulating institution for a divided society.
175
  
He suggests that for a divided society, an electoral reform must be able to (a) 
disrupt ethnic voting and parties, (b) induce moderation and ethnic 
accommodation, (c) promote representation of minority groups, and (d) 
encourage cross-ethnic coalitions.
176
  Part II of this article emphatically 
added that an electoral system must also help the consolidation of cross-
ethnic coalitions. 
Having exposed some failures of the runoff system in responding to 
the abovementioned needs in Part II, here I explore a number of alternative 
electoral designs, using the experiences of select countries that have adopted 
those alternatives.  In addition, in order to test how these alternative designs 
                                                        
173
  The last three elections including the presidential elections of 2009 and 2014 as well as the 
parliamentary election of 2010 instigated ethnic tensions.  The runoff of the 2014 presidential election 
almost brought about a civil war, if it was not for international intervention.  See Int’l Crisis Group, supra 
note 8, at 2; NDI, supra note 8, at 28; SMITH, supra note 8, at 3; Bezhan, supra note 8. 
174
  The two reports submitted by the Special Electoral Reform Commission to the government only 
suggest reform of SNTV.  See Farman 40, supra note 13; Farman 83, supra note 13.  The commission 
claims that the reports were produced after interviews and surveys with all interested parties such as voters, 
MPs, civil society, political parties, and lawyers.  See ELECTORAL REFORM: A REPORT ON THE STUDIES, 
PERFORMANCE, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL ELECTORAL REFORM COMMISSION, 187–213 
(Asadullah Sa’adati, ed., 2016).  For articles about electoral reforms see ANNA LARSON & NOAH COBURN, 
DERAILING DEMOCRACY IN AFGHANISTAN: ELECTIONS IN AN UNSTABLE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE (2014); 
REYNOLDS, supra note 28, at 6; LARSON, supra note 14, at 3; KATZMAN, supra note 12, at 5. 
  The few writings about the runoff rule in Afghanistan are merely for the description of the system 
and have no reform objectives.  See RASULY, supra note 15, at 75; HASHEMI, supra note 15, at 143; TAQI-
ZADA, supra note 15, at 170–82. 
175
  SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 219. 
176
  HOROWITZ, supra note 33, at 632.  
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apply to the Afghan political contest, I adopt a counterfactual simulation 
model, replacing the existing majority runoff with alternatives—while 
keeping all else the same—in the past three elections.177  Examining such 
scenarios helps determine what would happen if the runoff system were 
adjusted or replaced with an alternative system.
178
  
Some examined reforms are merely adaptations of the runoff system 
and others are alternative electoral designs.  The attempt is to explain their 
advantages and disadvantages in the context of Afghanistan, without 
precisely recommending one over the other.
179
  In fact, a combination of 
some of these rules may work better than one in isolation. 
A. Adaptations of the Runoff System 
 Studying constitutions and electoral laws of countries illustrates that 
the runoff system is no longer a rigid system with fixed features.  
Lawmakers have found ways to manipulate different aspects of this system 
in order to make it work properly in their societies in a given political 
environment.  
1. Lowering the Threshold: Adopting a Qualified-Runoff 
 Lawmakers in some states have lowered the bar for winning the 
election in the first round.  For instance, Costa Rica and Nicaragua adopted a 
                                                        
177
  The presidential election of 2002 in the Emergency Loya Jirga is not included in the analysis. 
178
  Perhaps one weakness of this model is that it may not be able to take into account all of the 
variables and changes that might result from replacing a majority-runoff with an alternative.  For example, 
it is common knowledge that electoral systems have their own mechanical and psychological effects on 
voters as well as candidates.  See PIPPA NORRIS, ELECTORAL ENGINEERING: VOTING RULES AND POLITICAL 
BEHAVIOR, 5–6 (2004); AREND LIJPHART, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A STUDY OF 
TWENTY-SEVEN DEMOCRACIES, 1945–1990 (1994); William R. Clark & Matt Golder, Rehabilitating 
Duverger’s Theory: Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws, 39 COMP. 
POL. STUD 679, 679, 685, 694 (2006).  Hence, Ghani and Abdullah’s’ votes, for example, might not have 
been the same under different electoral systems, even though social cleavages played a determinant role. 
But, coalition building and ethnic politics can be well predicted under this model.  When necessary, these 
shortcomings are highlighted in this part.  
179
  It bears mentioning that coalition institutionalization is a time-consuming process and a change in 
electoral law does not instantaneously lead to party or coalition development.  See Allen Hicken, Political 
Engineering and Party Regulation in Southeast Asia, in POLITICAL PARTIES IN CONFLICT-PRONE 
SOCIETIES: REGULATION, ENGINEERING AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 80, 85 (Benjamin Reilly & Per 
Nordlund, eds., 2008); Margit Tavits, The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in 
Post-Communist Europe, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 283, 283–98 (2005); Noam Lupu & Susan Stokes, 
Democracy, Interrupted: Regime Change and Partisanship in Twentieth-Century Argentina, 29 
ELECTORAL STUD. 91, 91 (2010); Fernando C. Bértoa, Party Systems and Cleavage Structures Revisited: A 
Sociological Explanation of Party System Institutionalization in East Central Europe, 20 PARTY POLITICS 
16, 18 (2012). 
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threshold of forty percent for winning in the first round.
180
  In Argentina, the 
threshold is forty-five percent.
181
  
 These runoff adaptations are referred to as qualified runoff,
 182
 
qualified majority,
183
 plurality with minimum threshold,
184
 and non-
majoritarian runoff.
185
  Qualified majority is a variation of the runoff system 
where states require a threshold below fifty percent for winning outright.
186
  
If no candidate wins the required threshold, which is known as the threshold 
of exclusion,
187
 the top two finishers compete in the second round to win the 
election.
188
 
A qualified-runoff might include a combination of (a) a threshold that 
is less than fifty percent, and (b) a minimum gap of votes (usually ten 
percent) between the top two finishers.
189
  For instance, the constitutions of 
Argentina,
190
 Bolivia,
191
 and Ecuador
192
 allow a candidate to become a 
president if the candidate receives over forty percent of the vote with a lead 
of more than ten percent of the vote over the second finisher.  In Nicaragua, 
a candidate can win with either forty percent or thirty-five percent of the 
votes plus a margin of five percent more votes than the second finisher.
193
  
By any of these measures, as Table VI indicates, none of the three 
presidential elections in Afghanistan would have needed a second round 
                                                        
180
  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA [CONSTITUTION OF COSTA RICA], 
art.139 (Nov. 7, 1949); CONSTITUTION OF NICARAGUA, art. 147 (1) (Jan. 1, 1987). 
181
  CONSTITUTION DE L'ARGENTINE [CONSTITUTION OF ARG.], Sec. 97 (May 1, 1853). 
182
  Qualified-runoff is a two-round electoral system which requires a threshold lower than absolute 
majority (50%).  See Norris, supra note 20, at 4; LEWIS, supra note 21, at 2–3. 
183
  Matthias Catón & Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies in 
Latin America, in POLITICAL PARTIES IN CONFLICT-PRONE SOCIETIES: REGULATION, ENGINEERING AND 
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 129 (Benjamin Reilly & Per Nordlund eds., 2008).  However, Rachel Lewis 
and her colleagues are skeptical about using the term majority for a threshold lower than 50%.  They argue 
that “[a] true majority requirement in fact means having to win more than half of the votes.”  Hence, a forty 
or forty-five percent threshold does not qualify as a majority system.  See LEWIS, supra note 21, at 2–3. 
184
  LEWIS, supra note 21, at 3.  
185
  Buisseret, supra note 97, at 3. 
186
  Catón, supra note 183, at 129. 
187
  The threshold of exclusion is the minimum possible proportion of the vote which a winning 
candidate must obtain.  See Douglas Rae et al., Thresholds of Representation and Thresholds of Exclusion: 
An Analytic Note on Electoral Systems, 3 COMP. POL. STUD. 479, 480 (1971); Buisseret, supra note 97, at 
1. 
188
  LEWIS, supra note 21, at 3. 
189
  Mainwaring, supra note 52, at 468. 
190
  CONSTITUTION OF ARG., Sec. 98 (May 1, 1853). 
191
  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO [BOLIVIA’S CONSTITUTION OF (PLURINATIONAL) STATE] art. 
166(1) (Feb. 7, 2009), https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf. 
192
  CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
ECUADOR], art. 143 (Sep. 2008), http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html. 
193
  THE CONSTITUTION OF NICARAGUA, art. 147 (1) (Jan. 1, 1987).  
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race.  Assuming that the candidates received the same votes under a 
qualified majority, in the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections, Karzai would 
have still been the winner.
194
  In 2004, he scored a decisive 55.4% with a 
margin of 39.1% from the second finisher.
195
  In 2009, he won 49.7% with a 
gap of 19.1% from Abdullah.
196
  In 2014, Abdullah would have been 
declared the president with forty-five percent of votes and a difference of 
13.4% from Ghani, who finished second.
197
  In this scenario, ethnic tensions 
were less likely to happen in the 2009 and 2014 elections since the winning 
candidates had the indisputable forty percent of votes in both elections.
198
  
Table VI.  This table illustrates the difference between the first 
and second leading candidates in the 2004, 2009, and 2014 
elections.
199
 
 
 A qualified runoff is a compromise between plurality and majoritarian 
systems,
200
 and it seems to provide three advantages.  First, it guards against 
the main flaw of a plurality system, which is allowing candidates to win with 
minority votes.
201
  Second, like a plurality system, it encourages broad 
coalitions.
202
  With a forty percent threshold, small parties and nonviable 
candidates see a lesser chance of a second round taking place.
203
  Therefore 
they would rather join winning coalitions than to enter the race.
204
  The more 
the candidates and parties have incentives to strategically coordinate, the 
higher the chances are for consolidation of coalitions.  Peter Buisseret, 
                                                        
194
  IEC 2004, supra note 60; IEC 2009, supra note 60. 
195
  IEC 2004, supra note 60. 
196
  IEC 2009, supra note 60. 
197
  IEC 2014, supra note 60. 
198
  In the 2014 election, ethnic tensions escalated due to irregularities in the second round.  Although 
in 2009, it was the first-round results that instigated ethnic tensions, a 40% threshold, which did not seem 
unobtainable for Hamid Karzai, would have discouraged ethnic tension in this election also.   
199
  IEC 2004, supra note 60; IEC 2009, supra note 60; IEC 2014, supra note 60. 
200
  SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 217; Bouton, supra note 29, at 3. 
201
  See Bouton, supra note 29, at 3; SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 217.  Here, minority vote 
literally means a small proportion of votes compared to the majority of votes, and not votes from ethnic 
minorities. 
202
  See SHUGART & CAREY, supra note  42, at 217. 
203
  See id. at 210. 
204
  Id. 
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analyzing qualified majority through a formal model, concluded that 
qualified majority reduces party fragmentation as it only benefits major 
parties.
205
  Gabriel Negretto
206
 and Fabrice Lehoucq
207
 in their respective 
studies of the qualified majority in Argentina and Costa Rica claimed that 
this system was adopted by these nations to sustain a two party system.  
Third, a lower threshold increases the chances for more than one 
ethnic group to win the election.  For instance, assuming the election results 
remained the same, in the presidential election of 2014, Abdullah would 
have been the first Tajik candidate declared as the president under a 
qualified majority.  His tally was forty-five percent, nearly fourteen percent 
higher than the votes of the second finisher.
208
  
There are some weaknesses associated with lowering thresholds, 
however.  Most importantly, the lower the bar, the less there is incentive for 
forming cross-ethnic coalitions.  It is likely under qualified runoff that 
coalitions reduce to one or two ethnic groups, as candidates might see a 
higher chance with forming a minimal coalition.  Particularly, a forty percent 
bar is lower than the estimated Pashtun population, which might encourage 
some ethno-nationalists to rally their campaign around mainly mobilizing 
Pashtun voters.  Other ethnic groups are also able to form a winning 
coalition with the coordination of mainly two or three groups.  
 The other issue with this adaptation is that it does not do away with 
some shortcomings of the runoff system.  Some opportunists and runoff 
seekers with considerable support have even more incentives to attend the 
contest.  Grouping and regrouping of the coalitions might still exist, though 
to a lesser extent, since the chances for serious candidates to win the election 
in the first round are higher.  
Some criticize lower-thresholds for decreasing the chances of a 
Condorcet winner.
209
  A Condorcet winner is the candidate who can win 
against each of the other candidates if the election is held one-on-one 
                                                        
205
  Buisseret, supra note 97, at 2. 
206
  Gabriel L. Negretto, Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America The 
Cases of Brazil and Argentina, 37 COMP. POL. STUD. 531, 540 (2004). 
207
  Lehoucq, supra note 79, at 142. 
208
  IEC 2014, supra note 60. 
209
  Laurent Bouton, A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections, 103(4) AM. ECON. REV. 1248, 
1249 (2013). 
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between the candidates.
210
  Most scholars concur that an election that 
ensures the winning of a Condorcet candidate is the fairest of all, other 
things being equal.
211
  However, one problem with Condorcet logic is that it 
has not taken social diversity into account.  Considering ethnic voting in 
Afghanistan, Abdullah was simply a Condorcet loser to all seven candidates 
in 2014.  Hence, based on Condorcet logic, Abdullah and other minority 
candidates will always remain losers as long as there is a candidate from the 
largest group.  However, there is a serious question about the fairness of an 
electoral system if some groups are permanent losers under that system;
212
 
more importantly, a system cannot lead to a stable democracy unless it 
includes and satisfies all major social forces.
213
  
Another criticism against the forty percent threshold advanced by 
Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart is that under this system a candidate 
might win with a questionable margin of difference.
214
  For example, a 
candidate may win with forty-five percent of the vote against forty-four 
percent for the runner-up.
215
  This criticism is warranted in cases where the 
threshold of distance between the votes of the first and the second finisher is 
not accounted for.  However, this criticism does not have merit in cases 
where, in addition to winning forty percent of the vote, the first finisher must 
win at least ten percent more of the vote than the second finisher.  
Additionally, marginal difference of votes is possible under any electoral 
system.  For instance, fifty-one percent versus forty-nine percent under a 
majority runoff system or thirty-four percent versus thirty-three percent 
under a plurality are possible but conventionally satisfying outcomes to 
recognize the winners.   
                                                        
210
  Victoria Powers, How to choose a winner: the mathematics of social choice 5 (Mathematisches 
Forschungsinstitut Oberwolfach 2015). 
211
  See Bouton, supra note 209, at 3–4. 
212
  See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black 
Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1080, 1135 (1991).  Guinier questions the fairness of the 
winner-takes-all rule, where blacks are the permanent losers in many districts although they have a sizeable 
population.  She further suggests that “as a matter of broader democratic theory, voting rights activists and 
litigators should begin to worry more about the fundamental fairness of permanent majority hegemony in a 
political system whose legitimacy is based solely on the consent of a simple, racially homogenous 
majority.”  JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 151 (1875) (“It is an 
essential part of democracy that minorities should be adequately represented. No real democracy, nothing 
but a false show of democracy, is possible without it.”). 
213
  See JOSEP M. COLOMER, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CHOICE, 58 (2001); 
SOFIE DREEF & WOLFGANG WAGNER, DESIGNING ELECTIONS IN CONFLICT-PRONE DIVIDED SOCIETIES: THE 
CASE OF SOUTH SUDAN 4 (2013), http://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_downloads/prif122.pdf; Lars-
Erik Cederman et al., Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis, 62 WORLD POL. 87, 88, 99–
105 (2010). 
214
  SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 217. 
215
  Id. 
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2. Constituency Pooling 
 One way to promote cross-ethnic coalitions would be to oblige the 
presidential candidates to garner a certain level of support across different 
regions.
216
  Drawing support simultaneously from across different regions, 
which are geographically non-contiguous, is called constituency pooling.
217
  
Some countries have adopted such an electoral system, which requires that 
in order to win an election, a candidate has to receive votes from different 
regions inhabited by different ethnic groups.
218
  For instance, in Indonesia, a 
candidate can win an election by receiving not only an absolute majority of 
votes nationwide but also at least twenty percent of votes in half of all 
provinces.
219
  Similarly, in Kenya, a winning candidate, in addition to 
winning majority votes nationwide, has to garner twenty-five percent of the 
votes in more than half of the counties.
220
 
Another variation of constituency pooling is concurrent pluralities.
221
  
This involves a plurality system, in which a presidential candidate must win 
pluralities concurrently in several regions of the country.
222
  The concurrent 
pluralities system is the invention of Nigerian Constitution makers.
223
  
According to this system, in addition to winning a nationwide plurality, a 
presidential candidate must win a minimum of twenty-five percent of votes 
in at least two-thirds of the states.
224
  If no candidate meets these 
requirements, only two candidates from the first round compete in the 
second round.
225
  Since states are drawn mainly along ethnic lines,
226
 the 
                                                        
216
  Benjamin Reilly, Introduction, in POLITICAL PARTIES IN CONFLICT-PRONE SOCIETIES: 
REGULATION, ENGINEERING AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 14 (Benjamin Reilly & Per Nordlund eds., 
2008). 
217
  Matthijs Bogaards, Comparative Strategies of Political Party Regulation, in POLITICAL PARTIES IN 
CONFLICT-PRONE SOCIETIES: REGULATION, ENGINEERING AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 52 (Benjamin 
Reilly & Per Nordlund eds. 2008). 
218
  Id. at 53. 
219
  Reilly, supra note 216, at 14. 
220
  CONSTITUTION art. 138(4) (2010) (Kenya),   
https://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/the%20constitution%20of%20kenya.pdf. 
221
  See SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 218. 
222
  Id.   
223
  Reilly, supra note 216, at 14; John B. Ejobowah, Integrationist and Accommodationist Measures 
in Nigeria’s Constitutional Engineering: Successes and Failures, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR 
DIVIDED SOCIETIES: INTEGRATION OR ACCOMMODATION? 234 (Sujit Choudhry ed. 2008). 
224
  CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), § 133. 
225
  Id. § 134. 
226
  SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 218. 
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first round election automatically requires candidates to make broader 
coalitions in order to appeal to voters across ethnic lines.
227
  
This vote-pooling
228
 formula works best when ethnic groups are 
territorially recognizable;
229
 therefore, it is an ideal rule for Afghanistan, 
which has geographically concentrated ethnic groups.
230
  Given the regional 
concentration of ethnic groups, Article 45 of the Election Law seems to have 
somewhat of a vote-pooling effect.  This article requires presidential 
nominees to collect signatures of “one hundred thousand voters, from a 
minimum of twenty provinces, two percent from each province.”231  On the 
surface, this threshold of nomination seems to suggest that presidential 
nominees need support from more than one ethnic group in order to qualify 
for candidacy.  In reality, however, this threshold is much too low to have a 
constituency-pooling effect.  It appears weaker in scope and scale than the 
vote-pooling rule in Nigeria and Indonesia.  In fact, this threshold of 
nomination may be criticized for favoring only the two largest ethnic groups 
in Afghanistan.  Pashtuns and Tajiks are the only ethnic groups that are 
estimated to have a minimum of two percent population in at least twenty 
provinces of Afghanistan.
232
  The next two largest ethnic groups, Hazaras 
and Uzbeks, are present in fewer than fifteen provinces.
233
  Therefore, while 
having little vote-pooling effect, this threshold seems to qualify candidates 
from only the two largest ethnic groups.  In the 2004 and 2009 presidential 
elections, when this threshold did not exist, there were some Uzbek and 
Hazara candidates who eventually won a large number of votes.
234
  After the 
adoption of this rule, however, the candidates in the 2014 presidential 
election were exclusively Pashtuns and a Tajiks.
235
  
                                                        
227
  Id.  Although this electoral system takes place in two rounds, Shugart and Carey suggest that it is a 
subset of the plurality system perhaps because there is no threshold of exclusion based on nationwide votes.  
228
  HOROWITZ, supra note 33, at 395 (using “pooling of votes” to indicate the transfer of votes across 
ethnic lines). 
229
  Bogaards, supra note 217, at 52. 
230
  Pashtuns mostly live in the south and seast; Tajiks live in the north, northeast, west, and central 
regions; Uzbeks mostly live in northern provinces; and Hazaras are concentrated in the central 
region.  See WIEBKE LAMER & ERIN FOSTER, AFGHAN ETHNIC GROUPS: A BRIEF INVESTIGATION  2–5 
(2011) 
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6393~v~Afghan_Ethnic_Groups__A_Brief_Investiga
tion.pdf. 
231
  Election Law 2014, S. 1112, art. 45. 
232
  Mobasher, supra note 3, at n.31. 
233
  See Mobasher, supra note 3. 
234
  IEC 2004, supra note 60. 
235
  Salih Doğan, 2014 Afghanistan Presidential Election: An Ethnic Analysis, 3 CAUCASUS INT’L 93, 
94 (2014). 
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3. The Legislative-Runoff236 
  Many scholars argue that one of disadvantages of a presidential 
constitution is its susceptibility to political deadlock, which results from the 
confrontation of the president and the legislature.
237
  Lawmakers in some 
countries have tried to get around this issue by requiring the second round to 
take place in the legislature,
238
 which resembles a key feature of 
parliamentarism.
239
  In other words, in these countries, if no candidate were 
to win an absolute majority in the first popular election, the top two or three 
candidates would have to compete for majority votes in the legislature.
240
  
Chile before 1973 and Bolivia (1967-2009) were among the few countries 
that adopted this system in their constitutions.
241
  
In Bolivia, if no candidate could win an absolute majority in the first 
round election, the congress had to elect from the top two finishers.
242
  This 
system encouraged permanent coalitions in Bolivia, as the legislative parties 
earned due influence in government formation.
243
  Edward Gamarra argues 
that after the adoption of this system, the “Bolivian politicians appeared to 
have achieved an equilibrium that could not have existed were the system 
purely presidential, especially if the president were elected by a majority 
runoff.” 244   Three broad coalitions were formed in Bolivia 245  as 
parliamentarians showed political maturity by entering into long-term 
pacts.
246
  Shugart and Carey argue that a purely presidential constitution in 
Bolivia would not have been capable of holding these coalitions together.
247
  
Some scholars referred to the Bolivian political system as a hybrid 
                                                        
236
  If no candidate wins a required majority through a popular vote, the frontrunners will compete in 
the legislature in the second round.  This runoff subtype differs from the other subtype where both elections 
are held in the congress.  The latter electoral system was used by Brazil until 1926.  See Lehoucq, supra 
note 79, at 137. 
237
  See Linz, supra note 30, at 52–54; Mainwaring, supra note 52, at 450–54. 
238
  Eduardo A. Gamarra, Hybrid Presidentialism and Democratization: The Case of Bolivia, in 
PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 363 (Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Soberg 
Shugart eds., 1997). 
239
  SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 78. 
240
  See Shugart & Mainwaring, supra note 104, at 17. 
241
  Id.; SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 82–86. 
242
  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 2, 1967, art. 40 (Bol.).  
243
  Gamarra, supra note 238, at 379. 
244
  Id. 
245
  Id. at 391. 
246
  Id. at 392. 
247
  SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 84. 
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presidential system
248
 for the reason that the president was elected by the 
legislature in the second round.
249
  
The parliamentary election of presidents offers some advantages that 
neither purely presidential nor parliamentary systems can offer.
250
  One 
advantage of a legislative runoff election is that it reduces the number of 
candidates by discouraging opportunist candidates and blackmailing 
coalitions.  This is primarily because the front-runners no longer need the 
support of different constituencies in order to win the second round; hence, 
the opportunists have nothing to offer for bargaining.  Besides, once 
coalitions are established, political outsiders have little chance to win the 
second round in the parliament and so they have little incentive to run.
251
  
Consequently, this system impedes fragmentation and regrouping of 
coalitions in the second round.  Moreover, while the executive power 
originates from parliament, it does not depend on the parliamentary vote of 
confidence for its survival.
252
  This ensures that the stability of the 
government is not put at risk, which is the case in fragmented parliamentary 
systems.
253
 
Nonetheless, legislative-runoff systems have some downfalls that 
need to be highlighted.  For instance, this system has a strong potential to 
encourage electoral corruption.  Candidates may find it easier and even 
cheaper to buy MPs rather than trying to build coalitions with them based on 
some policy platform.  Hence, it encourages patronage-based coalitions.  
Some studies have shown that political coalitions in Bolivia, for instance, 
were more driven by access to patronage than by policy platforms.
254
  MPs 
made a coalition to elect the president, but once the president was elected, 
the coalition weakened.
255
  Furthermore, some suggested that since after the 
election the president was not dependent on a parliamentary vote of 
confidence, presidents were less likely to stay loyal to coalitions.
256
  These 
                                                        
248
  Gamarra, supra note 238, at 365. 
249
  Id. at 363. 
250
  SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 77. 
251
  Id. at 85.  In Chile, the Congress sought to appease a political outsider’s protesting supporters by 
electing him as President, while blocking the implementation of his policies through legislation.  
252
  Id. at 77. 
253
  Id. 
254
  Gamarra, supra note 238, at 399. 
255
  Id. at 370. 
256
  SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 83.  
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issues were perhaps the reason that the legislative-runoff was replaced with 
the direct runoff system in the new constitution of Bolivia.
257
  
There is also a chance that in the legislature the second-place finisher 
wins the election.
258
  This might lead to some tensions since the candidate 
with the popular vote might raise the issue of legitimacy against the 
candidate with the legislative majority.  It becomes more problematic if 
votes are cast on ethnic bases in the parliament, considering the fact that 
ethnic voting is more visible in the legislature. 
In addition, the development of cross-ethnic coalitions is not insured 
under this system since building a minimal coalition is possible due to the 
presence of perfect information about the ethnic composition of the 
parliament.  Knowing the number of ethnic representatives in the parliament, 
candidates may establish a minimum coalition of two or three groups, while 
excluding others.  The following table shows the possibility of several 
minimal coalitions, using the current composition of Wolesi Jirga.
259
  
Table VII.  This table illustrates the possibility of minimal, 
oversized and grand coalitions, considering the current 
composition of Wolesi Jirga.
260
  
 
It shows that four minimal winning coalitions are possible where 
some major ethnic groups are excluded.  Similarly, the exclusion of at least 
one ethnic group is possible under three oversized coalitions under the 
                                                        
257
 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO [BOLIVIA’S CONSTITUTION OF (PLURINATIONAL) STATE] art. 
166(1) (Feb. 7, 2009), https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf. 
258
  For example, in Chile in 1925 the second-place candidate in the parliament outran the first-round 
frontrunner.  See SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 85. 
259
  Andrew Wilder, A House Divided? Analyzing The 2005 Afghan Elections, AFGHANISTAN 
RESEARCH AND EVALUATION UNIT (2005), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47c3f3c01b.pdf; Winning 
Candidate’s List, INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMISSION OF AFGHANISTAN, http://www.iec.org.af 
[hereinafter IEC List]. 
260
  Wilder, supra note 259;  IEC List, supra note 259. 
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legislative-runoff system.  Even these oversized coalitions are cost-
effectively less desirable since these coalitions lead to further distribution of 
power (cabinet seats).
261
  One factor that is likely to balance this flaw of the 
legislative-runoff system is the formation of proactive coalitions.  Since 
serious candidates want to win in the first round outright, they tend to form 
pre-electoral coalitions, which are cross-ethnic.  In effect, these proactive 
coalitions are likely to cut across ethnic lines in the parliament, should a 
second round take place. 
B. Alternative Electoral Designs 
1. Alternative Vote 
One alternative to the runoff system that the reformers should 
consider for the presidential election is Alternative Vote (AV).  This 
electoral system is also called Preference Voting,
262
 Preferential Voting 
System,
263
 Ranked Choice Voting (RCV),
264
 and Instant Runoff Voting 
(IRV).
265
  Under an AV system voters rank candidates in order of their 
preferences by putting one, two, etc., beside each candidate’s name.266  It is a 
majoritarian system
267
 since the winning candidate must be able to secure an 
absolute majority.
268 
 If no candidate wins over fifty percent of the votes,
 
the 
candidates with the lowest number of votes are eliminated and their ballots 
are redistributed to the candidates who were ranked second to the eliminated 
                                                        
261
  A minimum winning coalition is optimal when parties want to form a coalition, which helps them 
win the election but no more.  An oversized coalition is greater than necessary for winning.  A grand 
coalition is the coalescence of all relevant parties and groups regardless of their political or social 
differences in order to form a government.  Oversize and grand coalitions are usually formed for reasons 
other than winning elections, which include efforts to avoid war and violence.  For further explanation of 
these terms, see Norman Frolich, The Instability of Minimal Winning Coalitions, 69 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 
943, 943–946 (1975); E. Sridharan, Introduction: Theorizing Democratic Consolidation, Parties, and 
Coalitions, in COALITION 
POLITICS  AND  DEMOCRATIC  CONSOLIDATION  IN  ASIA  12  (2012),  https://www.researchgate.net/publicat
ion/298710092_Introduction_Theorizing_Democratic_Consolidation_Parties_and_Coalitions; LIJPHART, 
supra note 38, at 25. 
262
  See, e.g., Steven Mulroy, The Way Out: Toward A Legal Standard for Imposing Alternative 
Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 333, 341 (1998). 
263
  See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 769, 835 
(2013); see FARRELL, supra note 9, at 51. 
264
  See, e.g., FAIR VOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/rcv. 
265
  See e.g., LEWIS, supra note 19, at 2. 
266
  Mulroy, supra note 262, at 342; Stephanopoulos, supra note 263; Benjamin Reilly, Electoral 
Systems for Divided Societies, 13 J. OF DEMOCRACY 156, 158 (2002); REYNOLDS, supra note 28, at 47–48. 
267
  Norris, supra note 20, at 4.  
268
  Richard Rose, Elections and Electoral Systems, in DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS: SYSTEMS AND 
THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, 32 (Vernon Bogdanor & and David Butler eds., 1983).  However, there 
is no reason this threshold cannot be lowered in an AV system. 
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ones.
269
  This process continues until a candidate wins the majority.
270
  
Surplus Vote (SV) is a cousin (or a subtype) of AV, in which all candidates 
except for the top two finishers are eliminated at once.
271
  Then the votes of 
the eliminated candidates are distributed to the top two finishers based on 
the next preferences of the voters.
272
  This system is used for presidential 
elections in Sri Lanka
273
 and mayoral elections in London.
274
  The 
Constitution of Sri Lanka restricted the voters’ choices to three 
candidates,
275
 while in London the voters can choose only two candidates.
276
  
Considering the presidential election of 2014 in Afghanistan, using 
SV could have led to any outcome.  Indeed, a poll by Langer Research 
Associates indicated that Ghani was the second choice for twenty-one 
percent of respondents while Abdullah was the second choice for twelve 
percent.
277
  If we add these numbers to the actual number of the votes that 
Ghani and Abdullah won in the first round, Abdullah would have been the 
president with nearly fifty-seven percent of the votes.  However, considering 
only the first and the second choices of the respondents, Ashraf Ghani would 
have been the president with fifty-seven percent, since thirty-six percent of 
respondents—including unlikely voters—replied that they would cast their 
first choice for Ghani compared to forty percent of respondents whose first 
choice was Abdullah.
278
  In fact, using SV in 2014 would have led to fewer 
candidates in the first place.  Under this change, not only would Ghani and 
Abdullah have a different number of votes, the coalitions would also have 
been fewer and less susceptible to patronage bargaining and dissolution. 
AV has similarities to both plurality and runoff rules.  Some argue 
that it is designed to remedy the flaws of plurality and runoff systems while 
keeping their advantages intact.
279
  It is similar to plurality systems in the 
                                                        
269
  Id. at 32; Alan Renwick, Political Studies Ass'n, The Alternative Vote: A Briefing Paper (2011), 
https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/TheAlternativeVoteBriefingPaper.pdf. 
270
  See LEWIS, supra note  19, at 3; Mulroy, supra note 262, at 342. 
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  See REILLY supra note 39, at 16. 
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273
  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA, Sept. 7, 1978, art. 
94, https://www.parliament.lk/files/pdf/constitution.pdf. 
274
  RENWICK, supra note 269, at 4; ROGER MORTIMORE & IPSOS MORI, A GUIDE TO THE 
ALTERNATIVE VOTE (2011), https://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/RM-AVarticle.pdf. 
275
  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA, supra note 273, at 
art. 94. 
276
  ROGER, supra note 274, at 2. 
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  Langer, supra note 143, at 4. 
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  Id.  
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  LEWIS, supra note 21, at 3; AREND LIJPHART, PARLIAMENTARY VERSUS PRESIDENTIAL 
GOVERNMENT 20 (1992). 
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sense that it is only a one-round election.
280
  Therefore, it has the advantage 
of plurality systems, which is allowing only serious candidates to run in the 
election.  Opportunist candidates see fewer benefits to running and 
obviously there is no space for runoff seekers.  This way, both plurality and 
AV systems reduce the number of candidates, which in turn leads to broader 
and stronger coalitions.  However, unlike plurality systems, an AV system 
does not allow a candidate with a small number of votes to win elections.
281
  
This difference indeed gives AV an edge over the plurality system.
282
 
AV, and particularly SV, is similar to the runoff system in the fact that 
they both prevent candidates from being elected with only a minority vote.
283
  
As such, both systems make it impossible for a single ethnic coalition in 
Afghanistan to win an election.  Therefore, like the runoff system, AV offers 
the advantage of encouraging cross-ethnic coalitions.
284
  Both systems 
require voters to have more than one preference, if their first choice does not 
win.
285
  And the AV system, like the runoff system, tends to shift the 
preferences from extremist candidates to moderate ones.
286
  Nonetheless, 
unlike runoff systems, AV allows voters to make all of their choices in a 
single ballot, as opposed to requiring a second-round election.
287
  To this 
effect, the AV system bars coalition fragmentation and regrouping that are 
the normal course of coalition-making under the runoff system.  
Furthermore, the AV system has an edge over plurality and runoff 
rules in the fact that it gives more choices to the voters.  As Reilly posits, 
this system allows voters to reconcile their two conflicting aims: “the need 
to vote for their own ‘local’ ethnic candidate . . . and the desire to vote, using 
secondary preferences, for the candidate [with merits].” 288   More 
importantly, the AV system not only makes the candidates dependent on 
cross-ethnic votes,
289
 it also encourages vote-pooling among voters.
290
  
                                                        
280
  FARRELL, supra note 9, at 61. 
281
  Courtney, supra note 27, at 10. 
282
  FARRELL, supra note 9, at 61; RENWICK, supra note 269, at 9–10. 
283
  Vernon Bogdanor, Introduction, in DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS: SYSTEMS AND THEIR POLITICAL 
CONSEQUENCES 5 (Vernon Bogdanor & David Butler eds., 1983).  Some also argue that AV creates only a 
manufactured majority since in the initial tally candidates may not win over 50% of the votes.  See, e.g., 
Courtney, supra note 27, at 9. 
284
  Bogdanor, supra note 283, at 5. 
285
  Rose, supra note 268, at 33. 
286
  See Ben Reilly, Preferential Voting and Its Political Consequences, in FULL, FREE AND FAIR 
ELECTIONS 78–79 (Marian Sawer ed., 2001); RENWICK, supra note 269, at 15. 
287
  See id. at 32–33; see also Sartori, supra note 25, at 98; LAKEMAN, supra note 25, at 54–55. 
288
  REILLY, supra note 39, at 67. 
289
  See Reilly, supra note 286, at 158; DONALD L. HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA?: 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY (1991). 
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However, the vote-pooling effect of AV is conditioned by an ethnic 
distribution, where no ethnic group exceeds fifty percent of the 
population.
291
  By most estimations, ethnic distribution in Afghanistan 
perfectly meets this condition.
292
  
Nevertheless, some scholars have criticized AV by identifying some 
of its main shortcomings.  They have been particularly skeptical about the 
adoption of the AV system in countries with a lower level of literacy,
293
 
which surely includes Afghanistan.
294
  Among other things, they argue that 
for some voters, making several preferences and ranking candidates 
accordingly is not an easy task.
295
  Also, the complexity of the tallying 
process might make the politicized but uneducated voters doubt the 
results.
296
  Furthermore, some suggest that the AV system, like the runoff 
system, gives edges for larger groups over smaller groups since larger 
groups have more chances of winning inter-communal preferences.
297
  Also, 
intra-communal ranking of candidates is likely to favor larger ethnic groups.  
For example, AV in the 2000 presidential elections of Republika Srpska, 
favored a hardline Serb candidate because the Bosnian voters cast their 
second preferences to minor Bosnian parties rather than voting for moderate 
Serb candidates.
298
 
One other issue with the AV system is that voters are likely to plump 
(cast all)
 299
 their votes for a single candidate rather than making a number of 
choices.
300
  This tendency effectively turns the AV system into a plurality 
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297
  See REILLY, supra note 39, at 23; see Courtney, supra note 27, at 11. 
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  Kirsti Samuels, Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making, 6 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 663, 
678 (2006). 
299
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300
  See REILLY, supra note 39, at 156. 
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system.
301
  Making further choices compulsory is also problematic since it 
would encourage voters to make uncalculated and random choices that may 
affect the result very badly.
302
  Or take the case of the 2014 Afghan 
elections, in which under an AV rule, all Tajik voters would have had to cast 
their second and third preferences for a Pashtun candidate since there was 
only one Tajik candidate.  Pashtun voters, however, could cast their second 
and third preferences for several other Pashtun candidates.  Here, 
compulsory ranking gives an undue privilege to one ethnic group over the 
other.  
2. Proportional Presidency 
Linz criticizes presidential elections for being zero-sum games, where 
the winner wins the office and the losers have to step aside with empty 
hands.
303
  This feature of presidential elections becomes particularly 
problematic when candidates from a single group win the election every 
time.
304
  This leads to frustrations in other ethnic groups,
305
 which in turn 
hinders depoliticization of ethnic identities.
306
 
With only three presidential elections passing,
307
 the frustrations have 
already grown among different ethnic groups as Pashtun candidates have 
consistently won the office.
308
  These concerns have been reflected in the 
writings of Kenneth Katzman, who posited that the “electoral system . . . 
strongly favors the likelihood that the president will always be an ethnic 
Pashtun.”309  Indeed, one main reason for proposing a parliamentary and 
semi-presidential system instead of a presidential constitution by the 
Northern Alliance, an alliance of mainly Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek parties,
310
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302
  See id. at 157. 
303
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  See SONALI KOHATKAR AND JAMES INGALLS, BLEEDING AFGHANISTAN: WASHINGTON, 
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2011) https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-new-national-front-a-dark-horse-returns-with-three-riders/; 
Keith, supra note 50, at 5. 
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is that smaller ethnic groups want to make the highest executive office 
accessible to their candidates.
311
  Constitution designers in different 
countries have tried different paths to ensure that major ethnic groups are 
entrusted with the government.  For example, Switzerland’s Constitution 
introduced collegial presidentialism,
312
 which is a federal council of seven 
members where the presidency is rotated annually among its members.
313
  
This collegial executive was created to reflect the socio-political 
heterogeneity of Switzerland at the highest level of government.
314
  A 
similar system was tried twice in Uruguay but did not work.
315
 
In order to deal with the problem of winner-take-all, here I propose 
proportional presidency.  Proportional presidency enables the top two 
finishers to share the same presidential term, although with their own 
administrations in a sequence.  I call it proportional presidency since the 
span of each presidents’ administration must be proportional to the votes 
s/he receives.  In order to have an optimal outcome, this system must have 
certain characteristics.  First, under this system, one presidential term should 
be at least eight years to allow each administration to have a life span of at 
least three years.  Second, a presidential term should be equal to two 
parliamentary terms, allowing concurrent elections after each presidential 
term.  Third, the life span of each administration should be proportional to 
the votes each president receives, provided that each administration should 
have a duration of at least three years.  Fourth, if the vote share of the second 
finisher falls short of acquiring him/her three years of presidency, the first 
finisher gets to be the president for a full parliamentary term, after which 
another concurrent election should be held.  Fifth, the president with a 
higher percentage of votes runs the first administration and the one with a 
lower percentage of votes runs the second.  With these characteristics, a 
proportional presidency would have led to a single round of election in 2014 
in Afghanistan.  Under an eight year presidential term, Abdullah Abdullah 
would have taken the office for 4.7 years, proportional to his forty-five 
                                                        
311
  Id.; see also Hether K. Gerken, Keynote Address: What Election Law Has to Say About 
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percent win of the vote.  Subsequently, Ashraf Ghani would have been the 
president for 3.3 years (See Table VIII).  Electoral fraud and ethnic tension 
would have been less likely since all stakeholders would have been sure 
about the presidency of their candidates. 
Table VIII: This Table shows the duration of Abdullah and 
Ghani’s presidencies (compared to their votes) under an eight 
year proportional presidency.  
 
The proportional presidency I propose here is different from collegial 
presidentialism.
316
  In Switzerland, there is a council of seven-members who 
rotationally lead the country as the president every year.
317
  Proportionality 
in collegial presidentialism indicates that the number of the presidents is 
proportional to the social cleavages and respective political parties.
318
  In 
proportional presidency, however, proportionality determines the longevity 
of each administration by the share of votes that each president wins.  
Proportional presidency is also different from co-presidency, which was 
implemented to some extent in Cyprus (1960–1963). 319   Under a co-
presidency, as proposed by Shugart and Carey, the president and vice 
president are elected on the same ticket by voters.
320
  They form the same 
administration, although they represent different ethnic groups and clearly 
have equal powers.
321
  Proportional presidency, however, suggests separate 
administrations on the basis of the vote shares of two presidential candidates 
who have their own vice president nominees.  This way, proportional 
presidency avoids cohabitation
322
 that exists in co-presidency, as Shugart 
and Carey willingly admit.
323
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Proportional presidency has some pros and cons, like all other 
alternatives.
324
  The major advantage of proportional presidency is the fact 
that it properly responds to the frustration of ethnic groups by allowing their 
candidates to possibly run the administration in different presidential terms.  
Knowing their candidates can win elections, voters have little incentive to 
stay in their ethnic box and elites have little justification to mobilize their 
ethnic groups.
325
  However, this advantage does not equally apply to all 
ethnic groups; for instance, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and other minorities still have 
little chance to win elections.
326
  
One criticism against this system would be the discontinuity of 
administrations.  An incumbent coalition is eventually replaced by an 
opposition coalition, which may undo all of (or most of) its policies.  In 
addition, a concurrent election may help one administration obtain a 
majority in the parliament, but not the other.  Therefore, political deadlock is 
always a possibility under this system.  A viable solution to this problem is 
slate-proportional presidency, where each coalition introduces a slate of two 
presidential candidates rather than a single candidate.  The voters first vote 
for a slate of candidates and then for individual candidates within each slate.  
This way, although candidates’ votes determine the length of their 
presidencies, both presidents will be from the same coalition.  Since both 
presidents presumably follow the same political agenda, there is no need for 
the minimum threshold of three years of presidency for the second president.  
Even the presidential term can be reduced to merely four to five years.  
Including two vice presidents in the slate will allow each presidential 
ticket to represent all four large ethnic groups.  Allowing the two vice 
presidents to remain in the office for a full presidential term, regardless of 
president alternations, has three positive outcomes.  First, they will help with 
the continuity of policy implementation when the new president comes to 
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office.  Second, the supporters of vice presidents are likely to cast merit-
based votes when their vice-president candidates are members of the slate 
rather than nominees of individual candidates.  Third, the ethnic groups with 
vice president representatives will be satisfied with the fact that although 
their representatives in the executive do not have as much power as the 
presidents, their endurance in office is longer than that of the presidents.  
This is important because designing a system that includes only two ethnic 
groups is likely to alienate the two other ethnic groups, who are not likely to 
approve the system.
327
  
A somewhat similar experience to slate-proportional presidency can 
be seen in Mauritius.  In this country, one executive term was divided 
equally between two prime ministers, although through an agreement 
between the coalition partners rather than through some constitutional 
provisions.
328
  Thanks to this agreement, for the first time in Mauritius, an 
elite from a minority group—a non-Hindu—was able to become the prime 
minister.
329
  Colombia is another country that followed a similar approach.  
In 1958, in order to put an end to the civil war, the two dominant parties of 
Colombia agreed on a consociational form of government.
330
  Under this 
consociational arrangement, they rotated the presidency every four years and 
split seats in the Congress as well as in other government agencies evenly 
for over sixteen years.
 331
  Nonetheless, one major difference between these 
arrangements and the slate-proportional presidency is that the latter is a 
constitutional design and not a temporary arrangement between rival parties.  
In effect, the latter is likely to generate incentives for long-lasting coalitions.  
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CONCLUSION 
This article is the first attempt to study the merits of the runoff system 
under Article 61 in relation to the formation and consolidation of coalitions 
in Afghanistan.  It comports with most studies that associate the runoff 
system with the formation of broad-based coalitions.
332
  It also holds the 
somewhat conventional view that given the ethnic distribution in 
Afghanistan, the runoff clause, with a fifty percent threshold, has been 
instrumental to the development of cross-ethnic coalitions in all three 
presidential elections.  
This article, however, departs from the conventional wisdom in 
several important respects.  Most importantly, it suggests that the formation 
of coalitions does not necessarily imply the survival of coalitions.  To this 
effect, it observes that while encouraging the formation of cross-ethnic 
coalitions,
 
the runoff system has consistently hindered the perpetuation of 
these coalitions.  It reveals that by ensuring a second round, the runoff 
system turns the first round into an investment juncture for patronage and 
runoff seeker elites, who would eventually bargain with (or in the case of 
runoff seekers, challenge) a front-runner in the second round.  These 
candidates have formed their own small and large alliances in the first round 
and then joined the front-running coalitions in the second round, apparently 
after some serious patronage bargaining.  What this suggests is that under 
the runoff system no coalition remains intact, neither in structure nor in 
policy.  This process of coalition formation, dissolving, and reconfiguration 
under the runoff system has been an obstacle to the consolidation of 
coalitions.  
This article timely engages with the recent efforts on reforming the 
Constitution and electoral laws in Afghanistan.  Since the failure of the 2014 
presidential election, these efforts escalated in order to put an end to ethnic 
tensions that have tended to ensue during and after Afghan elections.
333
  
However, the ongoing legal and political discourse on reforming the 
electoral laws has centered on changing only the parliamentary electoral 
system.
334
  By revealing some inherent flaws with the runoff system, this 
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article suggests that Article 61 of the Constitution needs to be revisited.  For 
this very reason, Part III examined some alternative electoral designs.  These 
designs included qualified runoff, legislative runoff, constituency pooling, 
an AV system, and proportional presidency.  The observation of these 
institutional designs indicates that they are likely to remedy some of the 
negative impacts of the current majority runoff system on coalition building 
and electoral politics.  As such, these alternative designs are more likely than 
the runoff system to encourage the consolidation of cross-ethnic coalitions.  
In addition, these designs are likely to reduce ethnic tensions in Afghanistan.   
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